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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the liability for copyright infringement of streaming platforms 
and streaming box distributors in the EU, U.S. and in South Africa. As there have 
been no reported cases in South Africa in which copyright holders have instituted 
legal proceedings concerning copyright infringement against streaming platforms or 
streaming box distributors, this thesis analyses and compares the legal context in the 
EU and the U.S., in order to develop an appropriate approach for lawmakers and 
courts in South Africa regarding this issue. 
 
It concludes that the approach of the European Court of Justice with regard to the 
communication to the public right leads to legal uncertainty and should not be 
followed. Instead, it is suggested that South Africa implements into its Copyright Act 
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In recent years, streaming media has taken on increasing significance, while the use 
of file-sharing software like BitTorrent and similar technologies reduces. In 2016 
streaming video and audio accounted for 71% of total Internet traffic during peak 
periods in North America.1 In Europe traffic from this group accounted for over 45% 
in 2015, while file-sharing only comprised 7%.2 In contrast, in 2011 (P2P) file-
sharing in Europe still accounted for 30% of Internet traffic.3 On the one hand, this 
decrease is due to the availability of authorised streaming services such as Netflix or 
Spotify. On the other hand, streaming also occurs on streaming  platforms  that offer 
free content without permission of the copyright holders.  
This thesis will focus on the issue of streaming unauthorised copyrighted content 
through an examination of copyright law. There have been no reported cases in 
South Africa in which copyright holders have instituted legal proceedings concerning 
copyright infringement against streaming platforms or streaming box distributors. 
However, it may just be a matter of time before such cases emerge. The aim of this 
thesis is to develop an appropriate approach for lawmakers and courts in South 
Africa regarding the issue of the liability of streaming host providers and streaming 
box distributors. For this purpose, the current legal context of two of the largest 
digital media markets4, namely the European Union and the United States, will be 
analysed and compared. They both take a different approach with regard to the 
liability of streaming platforms and streaming distributors, which is why a 
comparison is useful  in revealing the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sandvine (2016). Global Internet Phenomena. North America, Fixed Access, p. 4. Available at: 
https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2016/global-internet-
phenomena-report-latin-america-and-north-america.pdf. 
2 Sandvine (2015). Global Internet Phenomena. Europe, Fixed Access, p.2. Available at: 
https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2015/global-internet-
phenomena-report-apac-and-europe.pdf. 
3 Sandvine (2011). Global Internet Phenomena Spotlight. Europe, Fixed Access, Spring 2011, p. 8. 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/55777280/Sandvine-Internet-Phenomena-Report-Spring-2011. 
4 In terms of revenue the U.S. ranks 1st and the U.K. and Germany 4th and 5th (Statista ‘Global 
Comparison – Revenue in the “Digital Media Market”’).	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The thesis will firstly examine the liability of streaming platforms and streaming box 
distributors under European copyright law. Emphasis will be placed on the recent 
CJEU judgement in the Filmspeler-case (C-527/15), which dealt with the liability of 
streaming box distributors, and the Pirate Bay case (C‑610/15), which affected the 
interplay between primary and secondary liability for copyright infringement in the 
EU. I will then compare the legal situation in the EU to the legal context in the US. 
Finally, this thesis will examine the current South African legislative framework, 
inclusive of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, and propose what the law maker 
and courts could learn from the European and US approaches regarding this issue.  
Much of this thesis will deal with secondary liability and its distinction from primary 
liability. In the context of a comparison of several jurisdictions, the term ‘secondary 
liability’ raises some definitional questions which have to be addressed at the outset.  
For the purposes of this thesis the term ‘secondary liability’ is meant to encompass 
situations where a person contributes to, induces, facilitates or is otherwise 
responsible for the direct infringement of a third party. Other common used terms for 
such conduct are ‘indirect’/secondary infringement’, ‘accessory liability’ or 
‘contributory liability’5. I will use the term ‘secondary liability’ as an umbrella term 
that covers all of these terms. However, it should be noted that under South African 
copyright law, secondary liability and secondary/indirect infringement are two 
different concepts. This will be clarified in Chapter 5.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  GB Dinwoodie Secondary Liability of Internet Service Providers 25ed (2017) 8.	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CHAPTER 2. STREAMING AND ITS ACTORS 
 
I. Technical background of media streaming 
Streaming media as a technological process can be defined as the continuous delivery 
of audio, video, and/or text to the end-user over the internet.6 The content is displayed 
to the end-user while it is being delivered by the provider. Whereas downloading 
means that media files are permanently saved on the users computing device, 
streaming is media data transferred in a stream of packets without storing the whole 
file. Instead, the data is ‘buffered’, i.e. temporarily stored, in the cache. Usually the 
stored data will be deleted as soon as the browser is closed.7 Another major difference 
to downloading is that the media is continuously transmitted to the user while the 
content is already being consulted. When downloading a file, a user has to wait for the 
whole file to be saved on his computing device before the file can be accessed.8 The 
client/server model is the most common streaming media system. The client requests 
data from a server on a computer network. The server then delivers the data to the 
client who renders and displays the data. Usually the interpretation of such data is done 
by ‘players’ or streaming technologies such as Windows Media Player, Adobe Flash 
Player or Apple QuickTime Player.9 
 
Essentially, there are two types of streaming that are used to disseminate works, 
namely live streaming and on demand streaming. Live streaming refers to streaming 
media that is simultaneously recorded and delivered in real time from a single source 
to multiple users.10 This form of streaming is also called webcasting. It is used to 
broadcast live events such as football games, conferences or real life activity in the 
context of social media (also called ‘lifecasting’11). Furthermore, it encompasses 
webradio, web-TV and the retransmission of cable or satellite television programs via 
the internet.12    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A DiStefano Encyclopedia of Distributed Learning (2003) 424. 
7 S Karapapa Private Copying (2012) 11. 
8 European Parliament Policy Department A: Economic And Scientific Policy ‘Streaming and online 
access to content and services’ 9, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/492435/IPOL-
IMCO_ET(2014)492435_EN.pdf (accessed on 1 December 2017); Burroughs Streaming media: 
audience and industry shifts in a networked society PH.D. (2015) 1. 
9 J Follansbee Get Streaming! (2004) xvi; see also European Parliament Policy Department A: 
Economic And Scientific Policy op cit (n8) 9-10. 
10 M Borghi ‘Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape’ (2011) 42 IIC 3. 
11 The term was first coined by Justin Kan the founder of justin.tv, see 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/28/AR2007032801719.html. 
12 M Borghi op cit (n10) 3. 
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On-demand streaming, on the other hand, is streaming media that has been previously 
recorded and then made available. Unlike live streaming where the user has to watch 
at a specific broadcast time, on-demand streaming allows users to choose the time and 
select the content they want to watch/stream. Basically, every content that can be made 
available for download can also be made available through on-demand streaming. 
Popular on-demand streaming platforms include Netflix, Hulu and Spotify.13 The 
actual transmission of the data is similar both in live and on-demand streaming. The 
main difference is that on-demand streaming requires content to be uploaded onto a 
host server, so that the user can request the transmission, whereas live streaming 
encodes data from a source to a digital form and then delivers it to the multiple users 
without recording it first.14 
 
To identify the main actors in terms of streaming one has to look at the chain of 
activities that occur. First, a content provider acquires an account with a host provider 
and uploads movies or music onto the host’s server. Thereafter, anyone with a 
connection to the internet and with the necessary streaming technology (=users) can 
access and stream the content. In turn, the connection to the internet is provided by an 
internet access provider, such as Vodacom.15 The transmission and routing of the 
stream data is carried out by the network operator who provides the infrastructure to 
transmit a signal. Additionally, in some cases so-called streaming boxes, like Apple 
TV or Amazon Fire TV, are used to connect a source of content which is hosted online 
to a television screen. Therefore, streaming box distributors also play a role in the 
context of streaming. With regard to live streaming the same applies but as outlined 
above, media content is not hosted by a host provider.  
 
II. Internet Intermediaries 
As shown above, streaming involves several activities by intermediaries. Internet 
intermediaries benefit from liability exemptions under most copyright law regimes, 
e.g. the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the European Electronic 
Commerce Directive (ECD) or the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
(ECTA), which contain provisions that limit the liability of Internet Intermediaries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 KJ Koelmann, PB Hugenholtz ’Online Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement’ 
(1999) Geneve: WIPO Workshop On Service Provider Liability 3-4. 
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Therefore, an understanding is necessary of what Intermediaries are. As the word 
implies, the intermediary is located between two or more persons. Intermediaries 
provide services that enable people to use the internet and to engage in online 
interactions.16 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) proposes the following comprehensive and accurate definition: 
 
‘Internet intermediaries bring together or facilitate transactions between third parties 
on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and index content, products and 
services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services 
to third parties.’17 
 
Not all Internet intermediaries are relevant when it comes to unauthorised streaming 
of copyrighted on streaming platforms, such as ecommerce intermediaries or Internet 
payment system intermediaries. Outlined below are the Intermediaries that do play a 
role in the context of streaming.  
 
1. Access providers 
An access provider is a ‘company which provides end-users with a data connection 
allowing access to the internet and the associated services (World Wide Web, Email, 
Chat rooms, Instant Messaging, Internet Telephony and so on).’18 They also provide 
the necessary facilities for content providers to publish and distribute their content 
online. Since the services of internet access providers and network operators are 
inextricably linked and often provided by the same company, this thesis defines both 
as access providers. They may also provide additional services like hosting content 
and publishing own content online, e.g. America Online (AOL) or Vodacom.19 The 
data that the access provider is transmitting is carried through an automatic technical 
process. Therefore, the access provider usually does not have any knowledge and 
control of the content that they transmit and route to the end-user.20 This is one of the 
reasons why many jurisdictions have implemented provisions that limit the liability of 
access providers.21 However, these provisions typically allow for injunctions against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 JD Lipton Rethinking Cyberlaw: A New Vision for Internet Law (2015) 11. 
17 OECD The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives (2011) 21. 
18 OECD Access Pricing in Telecommunications (2004) 214. 
19 OECD op cit (n17) 21. 
20 RH Weber ‘Internet Service Provider Liability: The Swiss Perspective’ 1 (2010) JIPITEC 145 at 
147. 
21 E.g. 17 U.S. Code § 512(a); Article 12 of The Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD) 2000/31/EC; 
s 73 of the South African Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) 25 of 2002. The 
limitations of liability will be discussed in more detail below. 
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access providers.22 Thus, the main issue in the context of this thesis is whether or not 
access providers can be obligated to block access by their customers to those streaming 
platforms that host or link to copyright infringing material that is made available 
through streaming.  
 
2. Host providers 
Host providers make Internet storage space available to Internet users. Users may rent 
website space or upload text, audio or video data.23 Most jurisdictions provide for 
limitations of liability for host providers, similar to those for access providers.24 The 
several types of streaming platforms which will be discussed in this thesis are either 
host or content providers. However, this does not mean that they qualify as host 
providers within the meaning of the respective safe harbour provisions. In the 
following, the various forms of host providers in the context of streaming platforms 
will be discussed. 
 
a. User-Generated-Content (UGC) streaming platforms 
UGC sites provide a platform for users to upload and store their own content. They 
usually provide for a search function and specific design so that other Internet users 
are able to find and stream the UGC. The most well-known example of such a host 
provider is YouTube, the most popular UGC host provider in the world in terms of 
video content.25 But also social network platforms such as Facebook can be seen as 
UGC streaming platforms as far as they make storage available to their users for 
uploading and posting their own streaming media.26 Such host providers risk being 
held liable when UGC incorporates third-party copyright infringing content or if a 
whole third-party protected work (e.g. movie) is uploaded onto the website. In order 
to minimise the risk, some host providers (e.g. YouTube) implemented filtering 
mechanisms that automatically scan videos for third party copyright protected 
content.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 17 U.S. Code § 512(j); Article 12(3) ECD; s 73(3) ECTA. 
23 P Baistrocchi ‘Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive on Electronic 
Commerce’ 19 (2002) SCHTLJ 111 at 116. 
24 E.g. 17 U.S. Code § 512(c); Article 14 of the ECD; s 75 of the ECTA.  
25 M Holland ‘How YouTube Developed into a Successful Platform for User-Generated Content’ 
(2016) 7 EJURC 53. 
26 See JB Nordemann ‘Liability for Copyright Infringements on the Internet: Host Providers (Content 
Providers) – The German Approach’ 2 (2011) JIPITEC 37 at 38. 
27 YouTube’s Content ID is such a filtering mechanism, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en. 
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b. File hosts and file host streaming platforms 
File hosts activities are limited to the mere provision of Internet storage. In contrast to 
UGC sites, they do not provide for a search function and particular structure for the 
storage. Some file hosts offer storage space against payment (e.g. SugarSync or 
Host4Africa), others allow internet users to upload content from their hard drive free 
of charge due to advertising revenue (e.g. Dropbox28 or zippyshare). These services 
usually return a URL which can be published and given to other people.29 Another 
type of file hosts are streaming video web hosts (e.g. streamcloud.eu or openload.co). 
These sites do not offer a search function but they encode the video and facilitate the 
streaming of the video.30  
 
c. Link-sharing streaming platforms 
Link-sharing streaming platforms do not store the content themselves but make links 
available to content that is stored by a file host or streaming video web host.31 These 
sites offer a platform which categorises the content and enables users to search for 
specific content. For example, putlocker-9.co or 123movies.com provide for such a 
search function to find a specific movie. The vast majority of these sites links to current 
cinema movies that were uploaded without the authorisation of the copyright owners.32 
Although these platforms might use different ways to organize their content, they all 
share the same characteristics: they allow popular movies and television shows to be 
streamed as embedded media within their website, while the actual content is being 
hosted by a file host.33 The embedded links give the impression that the user is staying 
on the original website, even though the media is in fact delivered from a different 
host. Link-sharing hosts can be designed as UGC sites, which means that the users 
post the links, or the website owners provide the links as their own content. In the latter 
case, such platforms are considered content providers. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Dropbox acutally uses a so-called ‘fremium business model’, where a set amount of storage size is 
offered for free and additional space and features are available against payment; see 
https://www.dropbox.com/help/space/dropbox-plus. 
29 JB Nordemann op cit (n26) 38.   
30 See http://streamcloud.eu. 
31 JB Nordemann op cit (n26) 38.   
32 See for example Paramount v Sky 2 UK EWHC 937 (Ch). 
33 D Balzarotti, SJ Stolfo, M Cova, Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses: 15th International 
Symposium (2012) 171. 
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d. Link-indexing streaming platforms 
Indexing host providers store indexes of digital content to make it easier for users to 
find specific content. Users can search the index and contribute to it.34 A famous 
example, in the context of P2P filesharing, is The Pirate Bay. The Pirate Bay allows 
Internet users to search for Torrent Files which fascilitate P2P-Filesharing amongst the 
users of BitTorrent client programs.35 These Torrent file indexes are especially used 
to share copyright infringing content such as illegal copies of films and music.36 Link-
indexing streaming platforms, such as alluc.cc, are mainly designed as a search engine 
(similar to Google) for streaming links. They search all general video hosts for 
streaming content. 
 
3. Content providers  
A content provider initiates the decisions to disseminate the content and to make it 
available to the public online.38 Hence, streaming platform operators who upload film 
or music onto their website or users who upload media with a file host are content 
providers. Since content providers initiate the decision to disseminate their own 
content, they are not regarded as internet intermediaries and consequently do not fall 
within the scope of the global safe harbour regimes/intermediary liability limitations. 
Obviously, in the case that a person uploads an infringing copy of a film or song, they 
can be held liable. However, the growth of participative internet platforms (UGC sites) 
– where platform owners encourage their users to publish and share their own content 
– has blurred the line between host providers and content providers.39 The main 
question is whether a host provider appropriates the third-party content, so that it can 
no longer be seen as third-party content but as his own content.  With regard to liability 
issues, the distinction between a host provider and content provider is of crucial 
importance because it determines whether the liability exemption for host providers 
applies. In this context, two main arguments are raised by copyright holders. First, a 
host provider that gains financial benefit from hosting copyright infringing material 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid. 
35 A Sobolciakova The Pirate Bay Liability LL.M. (2011) 27.  
36 See Stichting Brein v Ziggo EU (CJEU) C‑610/15. 
38 RH Weber op cit (n20) 146. 
39 OECD The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives (2011) 21. 
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should at least be partly liable for such infringement.40 Second, if the business model 
of a neutral host provider requires the storage of large amounts of UGC and if the host 
provider knows that some of them are infringing copyright law, then it should be 
responsible for not taking the content down.41  
 
III. Streaming box distributors 
Streaming boxes are standalone devices that run a specific software which allows its 
users to stream media from the Internet to their television screen or monitor.  They act 
as a ‘medium between, on the one hand, a source of visual and/or sound data and, on 
the other hand, a television screen.’42 The software installed on the device provides for 
a ‘user-friendly’ interface and allows users to use their remote control to play and view 
streaming media content such as videos, music, live sports and podcasts.43 Given that 
the software is usually open source various plug-ins exist which are freely available 
on the Internet. Some allow users to access legal streaming services such as Spotify, 
Netflix or YouTube. However, other plug-ins are specifically designed to give access 
to streaming websites that host or link to unauthorised copies of movies or music.44  
Usually, streaming boxes do not come with any plug-ins. However, some distributors 
developed a business model which is based on selling these streaming boxes with pre-
loaded plug-ins that enable the users to stream live sports, movies or music – otherwise 
only available upon payment of a subscription fee -  for free (e.g. Filmspeler45 or Kodi 
boxes46). These boxes are also advertised as being ‘fully loaded’ and as allowing users 
to watch movies ‘for free’.47 With regard to liability issues, the main question is 
whether these distributors are directly or indirectly infringing copyright. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgement On Liability 
and Inapplicability of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act Safe Harbor Defense submitted in Vicaom 
v Youtube and Google No. 1 07-cv-02 103 (LLS) 50-61. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Stichting Brein v Ziggo EU (CJEU) C‑610/15 at para 15; with regard to the ‘Filmspeler’ player. 
43 A Bridy ‘Amazon’s Kodi Box Ban and Copyright Liability for Device Distributors’ (2017), 
available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/03/amazon’s-kodi-box-ban-and-copyright-
liability-device-distributors (accessed on 8 December 2017). 
44 J Blum ‘Stichting Brein v. Jack Frederik Wullems (Filmspeler)’ (2017) 3, available at 
https://www.bristows.com/assets/pdf/LICL%20May-June%202017%20-%203-6.pdf (accessed on 8 
December 2017). 
45 See Stichting Brein v Ziggo EU (CJEU) C‑610/15. 
46 A Bridy op cit (n43). 
47 D Price ‘What are Kodi Boxes and Is It Legal to Own One?’ (2017), available at: 
http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/kodi-boxes-legal-own-one/ (accessed on 9 December 2017). 
	   15	  
IV. Users 
A user of streaming services is anyone who has access to the Internet and who requests 
the transmission of data packets to his computing device where it is displayed using a 
suitable media player. The number of individuals making use of legal streaming 
services such as Netflix, Spotify or Amazon Prime has increased drastically over the 
last years. For example, the average daily time spent with streaming digital video 
content among adults in the US increased from 35 minutes in 2012 to 72 minutes in 
2017.48 Increased availability of broadband connection and the ability to access 
internet from almost everywhere at any time are one of the reasons for this trend.49 
This also applies for South Africa, where the market entry of Netflix and Amazon 
Prime has led to more competition with local players like ShowMax and where more 
and more fibre-optic Internet providers make sure that  South African households have 
the bandwidth speed to stream videos.50 However, many users choose to stream from 
streaming websites that host or link to unauthorised copyright protected content.51 Yet, 
currently, laws and court decisions do not provide clear guidance as to whether users 
of such sites infringe copyright.  Apart from the question of liability, one has to 
consider that – even if we assume that individual users are infringing copyright – 
copyright owners would for practical reasons rather seek to hold intermediaries liable 
for infringement. First, intermediaries are more likely to be financially capable of 
paying the fines and damages and, second, they are much easier to identify than the 
large number of individual users.52 With regard to the liability of streaming platforms 
and streaming box distributors, the question whether a user directly infringes copyright 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Statista ‘Average daily time spent with digital video content among adults in the United States from 
2012 to 2017, by device (in minutes)‘, available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/420799/daily-
digital-video-content-consumption-usa-device/ (accessed on 8 December 2017). 
49 Ibid. 
50 LK Rawlins ‘Streaming search engine hits SA’ (2016), available at 
https://www.itweb.co.za/content/R8OKdWMDD9VMbznQ (accessed on 17 February 2018).	  
51 C Sterbenz ‘How Sketchy Streaming Sites Really Work — And Why Some Are Legal’ (2014), 
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/are-streaming-sites-legal-2014-4. (accessed on 8 
December 2017). 
52 O Dean and A Dyer Introduction to Intellectual Property Law (2014) 429. 
53 See discussion under Chapter 4 II.3. 
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CHAPTER 3: LIABILITY OF STREAMING PLATFORMS AND 
STREAMING BOX DISTRIBUTORS IN THE EU 
 
I. EU Rules On Copyright Infringement 
Before discussing the specific rules on intermediary liability, in particular the liability 
of host providers, it is necessary to outline the general rules on copyright infringement. 
This is because the ‘safe harbour’ regime of the ECD only applies in a negative 
fashion, i.e. only instructing Member States as to when intermediaries should not be 
held liable. It does not state when such liability should be applied. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine whether an intermediary has actually infringed or participated in 
an infringement of copyright before looking at the limitations of liability.  
 
The most important Directive with regard to rules concerning copyright infringement 
is the so-called ‘InfoSoc’ Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC), which harmonises most 
of the exclusive rights of the copyright owners. In particular, the rights of 
‘communication to the public’54, ‘making available’55 and ‘reproduction’56 can be 
found in the InfoSoc Directive. The dissemination of works online by way of 
streaming potentially implicates all three of these rights. The most relevant rights when 
it comes to websites hosting or linking to unauthorised streaming content are the 
‘communication to the public’ right and the ‘making available’ right. The reproduction 
right is rather subject to the liability of persons who upload infringing content as they 
initiate the making of a copy on the host provider’s server. In the following, for the 
purposes of this thesis these two rights will be carefully assessed.  
 
1. ‘Communication to the public’  
As new technologies emerged in the latter part of the 20th century it was necessary for 
international copyright law legislators to create a new general right of communication 
to the public. Especially with the arrival of the Internet the broadcast right and 
distribution right were not able to cover all activities that developed online, like for 
example wireless transmission or on-demand services.57 A general right of 
communication to the public was introduced by the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive (InfoSoc) 2001/29/EC. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive. 
57 PB Hugenholtz ‘Communication to a New Public? Three Reasons Why EU Copyright Law Can Do 
Without a “New Public”’ (2016) 47 IIC 798. 
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of 199658. This, in turn, formed the basis for Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive 
which states that:  
 
‘Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit 
any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including 
the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the 
public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.’59  
 
The question of what exactly constitutes a communication to the public is not clearly 
defined. However, the recitals of the InfoSoc Directive provide some insight of what 
is meant by ‘communication to the public’. Some important background to this 
provision is given by recital 23. It provides that the authors’ right of communication 
to the public ‘should be understood in a broad sense covering all communication to 
the public not present at the place where the communication originates.’ Furthermore, 
the right applies to ‘any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by 
wire or wireless means, including broadcasting.’ Thus, the decisive factor is whether 
the public to which the work is communicated is located in a different place from the 
place where the communication originates. This means that any local communication 
such as recitations or music performances do not fall under this right. On the other 
hand, it covers cable, broadcast and of course online transmission.60 This broad 
definition is somewhat limited by recital 27 which stipulates that the ‘mere provision 
of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount 
to communication within the meaning of [the] Directive’. However, the question of 
which act exactly constitutes the ‘mere provision of physical facilities’ is disputed. It 
could be argued that only the provision of hardware is covered, as opposed to the 
services that use them. On the other hand, one could say that the provision 
encompasses the services of other internet intermediaries as well.61 This provision and 
its interpretation is particularly relevant for host providers or streaming box 
distributors, since both could be – depending on the facts – seen as only providing 
physical facilities. Importantly, the CJEU seems to prefer the narrower interpretation.62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Geneva, December 20, 1996. 
59 PB Hugenholtz op cit (n56) 798. 
60 C Angelopoulos ‘On Online Platforms and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market’ (2017) 18. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 at para 47. 
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2. ‘Making Available’ 
According to Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, the right of communication to 
public includes the right of making available to the public. The specificity of making 
available compared to communication to the public, however, is that it also covers 
situations where members of the public have the choice as to the time and the place 
they want to enjoy the work, i.e. on demand. Whether the act of making available 
causes the work to be enjoyed is irrelevant. The actual offering suffices.63 Thus, the 
communication to the public right encompasses two kinds of activities. First, activities 
such as webcasting or internet radio where the user has to watch at a specific 
broadcasting time. Second, user-initiated modes of communications such as online 
streaming services where the use can ‘pull’ the content as his convenience.64 
Therefore, it is clear that the communication to the public right applies to users who 
upload content to the above mentioned UGC, file host streaming platforms. On the 
other hand, it is not quite as clear whether the platforms or streaming box distributors 
who merely provide the infrastructure and services to upload the videos are making 
the content available to public.  
 
The InfoSoc Directive does not provide further guidance on what exactly constitutes 
a communication to the public. Instead, the CJEU has developed several criteria and 
definitions to clarify the notion of communication to the public in a number of cases. 
In its decisions the CJEU placed emphasis on recitals 9 and 10 which require Member 
States to provide for a high level of protection in order to guarantee the availability of 
an appropriate reward and the opportunity for satisfactory returns on the author’s 
investment.65 Moreover, the CJEU considered the objectives of recitals 3 and 31 which 
are to maintain a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests of copyright 
holders in protecting their intellectual property rights and, on the other, the protection 
of the interests and fundamental rights of users of protected objects.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 E Papadaki ‘Hyperlinking, making available and copyright infringement: lessons from European 
national courts’ (2017) 8 EJLT 4; Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso  EU 
(CJEU) C-135/10. 
64 Angelopoulos op cit (n60) 18. 
65 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 at para 34; GS Media v Sanoma EU (CJEU) 
C‑160/15 at para 30. 
66 GS Media v Sanoma EU (CJEU) C‑160/15 at para 31. 
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From this it is clear that the interpretation of the communication to the public and 
making available right is crucial for streaming platforms that offer on-demand or live 
streaming services as well as for streaming box distributors. 
 
II. Case law of the CJEU 
1. SGAE v Rafael Hoteles 
The first comprehensive case with respect to the communication to the public right 
was SGAE v Rafael Hoteles67 ruled on 7 December 2006. In this case the CJEU had to 
decide whether the installation in individual hotel rooms of TV sets to which a satellite 
or terrestrial television signal is sent by cable constitute an act of communication to 
the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. The TV sets 
enabled the guests to watch programmes on channels whose signals were received by 
the hotel main aerial and then distributed to each of the TV sets in the room. The CJEU 
concluded that the hotel organisation intervened, in full knowledge of the 
consequences of its action, to give access of the protected work to its customers.68 It 
discussed whether the installation was just a ‘mere provision of physical facilities for 
enabling or making a communication’ in terms of recital 27. The court concluded that 
companies that sale or hire TV sets could be seen as only providing physical facilities 
but not the hotel, since it installed and then distributed the signal to its customers.69 As 
mentioned above, this case shows that the CJEU interprets the notion of ‘mere 
provision of facilities’ literally. This decision was criticised by European copyright 
scholars as being a ‘logical mistake’. It was argued that the requirement of ‘intervening 
… to give access’ was too broad because it would cover any act that provides access 
to a work, for example, where a bookstore or newsagent lets the public into its 
premises.70 Instead, scholars put forward the concept of ‘transmission’ as the key term 
for the act of communication.71 Furthermore, in SGAE v Rafael Hoteles the CJEU 
focused on the notion of ‘public’. The Directive itself does not define the term public. 
The court referred to previous case law72 and defined public as an ‘indeterminate 
number of potential’ users.73 In addition, the court laid down the requirement of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 
68 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 at para 42. 
69 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 at para 46. 
70 European Copyright Society ‘Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in case C-466/12 Svensson’ 
(2013) 6 University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series 6 
71 European Copyright Society op cit (n70) 3. 
72 Mediakabel BV v Commissariaat voor de Media EU (CJEU) Case C-89/04. 
73 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 at para 37. 
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‘new’ public, meaning ‘a public different from the public at which the original act of 
communication of the work is directed’.74 It concluded that the hotel guests did amount 
to a ‘new’ public, since the author of the broadcast only considers direct users, that is, 
the owners of reception equipment. Whereas the hotel guests receive the broadcast 
because the hotel owner retransmits them to their TV sets.75 
 
2. The ‘new’ public requirement 
The CJEU confirmed the requirement of a ‘new’ public in several subsequent cases. It 
thus became an important requirement and was defined in Football Association 
Premier League as ‘a public which was not taken into account by the authors of the 
protected works when they authorised their use by the communication to the original 
public.’76 Furthermore, the CJEU sharpened the notion of public in Del Corso77 and 
Phonographic Performance78 by stating that the term refers to an indeterminate 
number of people, thereby excluding ‘specific individuals belonging to a private 
group’ and that it must be a ‘fairly large number of people’. From that it can be 
concluded there is a threshold that has to be met before a group can be considered as 
being the public. Groups that are too small or insignificant will not qualify as the 
public. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the CJEU made clear in SGAE that the 
cumulative effect has to be considered when determining the requirement of public. 
Therefore, it does not only matter how many people have access to the work at the 
same time but also how many have access to it in succession (for example successive 
hotel guests).79  
 
In addition, in Football Association Premier League the CJEU also found that profit-
making nature of the respective act is not a necessary precondition but a relevant 
factor.80 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 at para 40. 
75 SGAE v Rafael Hoteles EU (CJEU) C-306/05 at para 41. 
76 Football Association Premier League v Karen Murphy EU (CJEU) joined cases C-403/08 and C-
429/08 at para 197. 
77 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso EU (CJEU) C-135/10 para. 83-87. 
78 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland and Attorney General EU (CJEU) C-162/10 
at para. 33-35. 
79 Angelopoulos op cit (n60) 20. 
80 Football Association Premier League v Karen Murphy EU (CJEU) joined cases C-403/08 and C-
429/08 at para 204. 
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In TVCatchup the CJEU further refined the requirement of a ‘new’ public. It noted that 
the public does not have to be a ‘new’ public when the work is communicated ‘under 
specific technical conditions, using a different means of transmission’.81 The 
defendant, TVCatchup, retransmitted television broadcast over the internet through 
live online streaming. Before using the service, users had to show a valid TV license.82 
Thus, the recipients of the online streams were persons who had already been taken 
into account by broadcasting companies. According to CJEU’s ‘new’ public principle, 
this would have suggested that TVCatchup did not reach a ‘new’ public. However, the 
court held that in circumstances that the work is communicated under different 
technological means it is no longer necessary to examine whether the work is 
communicated to a ‘new’ public.83 With this judgement a dual system of 
communication to the public was established. Either (1) the work has to be 
communicated to a ‘new’ public or (2) the work must be communicated by using other 
technical means from the one’s used by the copyright holder.  
 
3. Linking 
The question whether the provision of links may constitute a communication to the 
public by violating the copyright holder right of making available has been dealt with 
by the CJEU in a number of recent cases. This issue particularly affects link-sharing 
and indexing streaming platforms. The first decision in the context of linking was 
handed down in the Svensson84 case on 18 September 2012. The applicants were all 
journalists who wrote articles for the Göteborgs-Posten newspaper which published 
the articles on its website. The defendant, Retriever Sverige, operates its own website 
and provided links to articles of other websites. Users of the Sverige website can click 
on the link and will then be redirected to the website where the original article was 
published. The journalists brought an action against Retriever Sverige on the ground 
that the website was infringing their making available right. As a first step the CJEU 
held that the provision of links on a website to copyright protected content of another 
website affords users of the first site direct access to those works. Thus, it must be 
considered as an act of making available and therefore constitutes a communication to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 ITV Broadcasting and others v TVCatchup Ltd EU (CJEU) Case C-607/11 at para 39. 
82 ITV Broadcasting and others v TVCatchup Ltd EU (CJEU) Case C-607/11 at para 10. 
83 ITV Broadcasting and others v TVCatchup Ltd EU (CJEU) Case C-607/11 at para 39. 
84 Svensson v Retriever Sverige EU (CJEU) Case C‑466/12. 
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the public.85 However, as a second step the court asserted whether the communication 
reached a ‘new’ public. As in previous rulings the court noted that a ‘new’ public is a 
public ‘that was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised 
the initial communication to the public’.86 It concluded that the provision of a link to 
another website which is freely available to all potential internet users does not 
constitute a communication to a ‘new’ public, since the users must be deemed to be 
potential recipients of the initial communication (as long as the linked website is freely 
available to all internet users).87  
In addition, it held that the use of an embedded link – a link where the linked content 
appears in such a way as to give the impression that it is appearing on the site on which 
that link is found – would not change the outcome in any way. The CJEU later 
confirmed its view on linking in the Bestwater case.88  
 
One remaining question was whether linking to content that was published without the 
consent of the copyright owner constitutes a communication to the public. The CJEU 
had to consider this question in the GS Media case89. In its analysis the court starts 
with noting that a fair balance must be maintained between, on the one hand, the 
interests of the copyright holder and, on the other hand, the interests and fundamental 
rights of users of protected works.90 The court emphasised the importance of the 
internet to freedom of expression and information and that hyperlinks contribute to the 
‘sound operation of the internet as well as to the exchange of opinions and 
information’.91 It further observes that it is difficult for individuals to ascertain whether 
the linked content is copyright protected and whether such content was posted without 
the consent of the copyright holder. Therefore, as a general rule, it cannot be said that 
the person ‘intervene[s] in full knowledge of the consequences of his conduct in order 
to give customers access to a work illegally posted on the internet’.92 As a result, it 
does not constitute a communication to the public when a person posts a link to content 
that was uploaded without the consent of the copyright holder, if the person does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Svensson v Retriever Sverige EU (CJEU) Case C‑466/12 at para 23. 
86 Svensson v Retriever Sverige EU (CJEU) Case C‑466/12 at para 24. 
87 Svensson v Retriever Sverige EU (CJEU) Case C‑466/12 at para 27. 
88 Bestwater v Mebes and Potsch EU (CJEU) C-348/13. 
89 GS Media v Sanoma Media and others EU (CJEU) C‑160/15.  
90 GS Media v Sanoma Media and others EU (CJEU) C‑160/15 at para 31. 
91 GS Media v Sanoma Media and others EU (CJEU) C‑160/15 at para 44-45. 
92 GS Media v Sanoma Media and others EU (CJEU) C‑160/15 at para 48. 
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have knowledge thereof. However, the situation is different when such a person knew 
or ought to have known that the link he posted provides access to copyright protected 
work which was uploaded without the consent of the copyright holder. Moreover, the 
court noted that when posting links is carried out for profit, it can be expected that the 
poster of such links carries out the necessary investigations on the legality of such 
content. This leads to a rebuttable presumption of knowledge. If such a presumption 
is not rebutted the act of posting a hyperlink to content which was placed online 
without the consent of the copyright holder constitutes a ‘communication to the public’ 
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive.93  
  
It is worth noting that the CJEU’s approach on hyperlinking has been much criticised 
by some European copyright law scholars. The ‘European Copyright Society’, for 
istance, argued that ‘hyperlinking in general should be regarded as an activity that is 
not covered by the right to communicate the work to the public embodied in Article 3’ 
of the Directive.94 The main argument is that hyperlinks merely provide the viewer 
with information as to the location of a page that the user can choose to access or not 
and thus do not communicate a work.95  
 
4. The Filmspeler96 case 
In its Filmspeler decision of 26 April 2017 the CJEU had to answer the question 
whether the distribution of a streaming box constitutes a communication to the public 
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. The defendant, Wullems, 
sold a streaming box under the name ‘Filmspeler’ on various websites. On that 
streaming box he had installed an open source software, which made it possible to play 
files through a user-friendly interface via structured menus.97 In addition, Wullems 
installed add-ons that contained hyperlinks to connect to streaming websites operated 
by third parties, which, inter alia, gave access to media content which was uploaded 
without the consent of the copyright holder.98  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 GS Media v Sanoma Media and others EU (CJEU) C‑160/15 at para 51. 
94 European Copyright Society ‘Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson’ 
(2013) available at https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/opinion-on-the-reference-to-the-cjeu-in-case-
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95 European Copyright Society op cit (n94) at para 36. 
96 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems EU (CJEU) C-527/15. 
97 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems EU (CJEU) C-527/15 at para 16. 
98 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems EU (CJEU) C-527/15 at para 17. 
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The primary question in this case was whether the distribution of that player was a a 
communication to the public of the unauthorised copyrighted works streamed through 
the box. The court began its analysis by referring to previous case law such as the GS 
Media case. According to that case law a communication to the public takes place 
when the user ‘intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of his action, to give 
access to a protected work to his customers does so, in particular, where, in the absence 
of that intervention, his customers would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the […] 
work’.99 The CJEU concluded that Wullems, in full knowledge of his actions, pre-
installs the add-ons, which enabled his customers to access the protected works, since 
otherwise they would have difficulties to find the works on the Internet.100 Therefore, 
his actions were to be regarded as an act of communication and should not be confused 
with the mere provision of physical facilities, referred to in recital 27 of the 
Directive.101 With regard to the ‘public’ requirement, the court observed that the 
Filmspeler player had been purchased by a fairly large number of people and that the 
communication is ‘aimed at an indeterminate number of potential recipients and 
involves a large number of persons’.102 In line with its ruling in the GS Media case, 
the CJEU concluded that this communication is also directed to a ‘new’ public, since 
the works in question were uploaded without the consent of the copyright holders.103  
 
5. The Pirate Bay104 case 
The CJEU’s most recent case on the communication to the public right concerned the 
legality of the online file-sharing platform The Pirate Bay (TPB). Even though this 
judgement concerned a file-sharing platform, a lot can be derived from it for the legal 
assessment of online streaming platforms. The reference to the CJEU arose in the 
context of litigation between Stichting Brein, a foundation which safeguards the 
interests of copyright holders, and Ziggo BV and XS4ALL, two internet access 
providers. Stichting Brein requested an order requiring the internet access provider to 
block access for their customers to the website TPB. TPB indexes BitTorrent files 
relating to protected works and provides a search engine that allows users of that 
platform to locate those works and to share them in the context of a peer-to-peer 
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network by using a BitTorrent client. TPB neither hosts any protected works nor 
provides the BitTorrent client.105 Furthermore, the Torrent files are not uploaded by 
the operators of the TPB platform but by its users.106 The question before the CJEU 
was whether TPB’s activities constitutes a communication to the public. The court 
approached the issue by stating that several complementary criteria have to be taken 
into account when assessing whether a communication to the public has taken place. 
One of those criteria is the ‘indispensable role played by the user and the deliberate 
nature of his intervention’.107 An act of communication is given when the user 
‘intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of his action, to give his customers 
access to a protected work’.108 Applying these rules to the facts of the case, the court 
concluded that there is no dispute that copyright protected works are made available, 
by means of the TPB platform, to the public. Thus, an act of communication to the 
public has taken place.109 The question was however whether the operators of the 
platform were responsible for this making available, since they did not upload the 
works but merely provided the platform. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the 
operators of TPB, ‘by making that platform available and managing it, provide their 
users with access to the works concerned. They can therefore be regarded as playing 
an essential role in making the works in question available.’110  
 
Moreover, the court discussed whether TPB could rely on only making a ‘mere 
provision’ of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication, within the 
meaning of recital 27 of the Directive. In that regard, the CJEU mentioned that TPB 
‘indexes torrent files in such a way that the works to which the torrent files refer may 
be easily located and downloaded by the users of that sharing platform.’111 It classifies 
them under different categories and ensures that a work has been placed in the right 
category. Furthermore, it deletes faulty or obsolete files. As a result, the court held that 
the operators are not merely providing physical facilities.112  
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With regard to the knowledge requirement, the CJEU stated that the operators of TPB 
were informed that they provide access to works that have been published without the 
authorisation of the copyright holder. Therefore, they could not be unaware that they 
make infringing works available to the public.113  
Since a large number of subscribers of the internet access providers downloaded 
content using the TPB platform, the communication is aimed at an indeterminate 
number of potential recipients and involves a large number of persons. Thus, it is 
directed to a public.114 Lastly, the court noted that the TPB platform is generating 
considerable advertising revenues. This profit-making nature also contributes to the 
finding that TPB’s acts fall under ‘communicating to the public’ within the meaning 
of Article 3(1) of the Directive.  
 
6. Conclusion for streaming platforms and streaming box distributors  
To date, no indication on whether UGC platforms or file hosts communicate works 
uploaded by their users to the public has been given at EU level. The requirement of a 
‘new public’ will most likely be met. Anyone with an Internet connection has access 
to videos uploaded on UGC and file host platforms. This constitutes a public that has 
not been taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial 
communication to the public. The question remains whether this constitutes a 
communication by the UGC and file host streaming platforms. As the CJEU pointed 
out in its decisions relating to Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, the alleged infringer 
must have ‘intervened, in full knowledge of the consequences of his action, to give 
access to the protected work to others’.115 The indispensable role and the deliberate 
nature of his intervention are relevant. Thus, the crucial aspect will be the knowledge 
requirement. For instance, in the Pirate Bay case the CJEU stressed that the operators 
have been informed that their platform provides access to copyright-protected works 
and that they expressly displayed, on that platform, their intention of making protected 
works available to users.116 Mainstream UGC streaming platforms, such as YouTube 
and Dailymotion, do not advertise with making protected works available or encourage 
their users to upload protected works. On the contrary, these sites usually incorporate 
provisions in their terms and use that prohibit to upload any third party copyright 
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material.117 Additionally, these sites as well as file hosts have implemented  automatic 
filters that search for copyright protected content.118 Therefore, mainstream providers 
who do not promote infringing use, do not have actual knowledge of the infringing 
content and who respond to takedown-notices are most likely not communicating 
works to the public within the meaning of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive.  
 
With regards to sites that share or index links to unauthorised streaming content, the 
GS Media case provides guidance. The CJEU pointed out that a link to content that 
was uploaded without the consent of the copyright holder only constitutes a 
communication to the public when the poster of that link knew or ought to know of 
the infringing content. Furthermore, when posting links is carried out for profit, it can 
be expected that the poster of such links carries out the necessary investigations on the 
legality of such content. A lot of websites share or index links mainly to copyright 
protected works. They categorise links in categories such as “current feature films” or 
“series” and provide editorial oversight over the posted links.119 Since these sites will 
usually have knowledge of the fact that the links provide access to protected work that 
was uploaded without the consent of the copyright holders, they will most likely 
infringe the right of communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3 of 
the InfoSoc Directive. Therefore, whether a link-sharing or indexing website will be 
held liable for communicating works to the public depends on the structure and 
operation of the site.  
 
With regard to the liability of streaming box distributors, the CJEU pointed out that 
the deliberate act of installing add-ons on the streaming box, which contained 
hyperlinks to copyright protected works, was the crucial aspect. Furthermore, the court 
emphasised that the distributor also advertised these add-ons, so that the main 
attraction of such a player is to enable users to gain access to sites on which copyright-
protected films are made available without the consent of the copyright holders. It 
follows from that that the distribution of streaming boxes as such does not constitute 
a communication to the public. An act of communication requires an intervention, e.g. 
in form of installing add-ons. The mere distribution of a streaming box without pre-
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installing add-ons should constitute a ‘mere provision of physical facilities for 
enabling or making a communication’ in terms of recital 27 of the InfoSoc Directive, 
which does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of Article 3. 
 
7. Primary and secondary liability 
Besides laying down the requirements of the right of communication in more concrete 
terms, the recent case law of the CJEU, especially the Pirate Bay and Filmspeler case, 
had impact on the interplay between primary and secondary liability for copyright 
infringement. The EU has harmonized the conditions for primary liability in its 
InfoSoc Directive. The conditions of secondary liability are, however, not harmonised 
and left to the legal systems of the Member States. It has been argued that the Pirate 
Bay case as well as the Filmspeler case are actually cases of secondary infringement 
because the services of the TPB platform and Filmspeler are used by others to infringe 
copyright.120 Both, the TPB platform as well as the distributor of the Filmspeler rather 
contribute, induce or facilitate the copyright infringement of the primary wrongdoer. 
By regarding such contributory actions as communication to the public and by 
introducing the knowledge requirement within the scope of Article 3 of the Directive, 
the CJEU blurs the line between primary liability and secondary liability because 
knowledge was never a traditional condition for direct copyright infringement. Instead, 
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge was always a requirement for secondary 
liability.121  This decision could have an effect and could be applicable to different 
types of online platforms and intermediaries, including online streaming platforms.  
Why did the CJEU (over-) expand the notion of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive and 
considered the acts of TPB as direct infringement? The reason is most likely the 
absence of any real harmonisation of secondary liability on the European level. By 
applying and expanding the rules of primary infringement to cases where a person is 
merely facilitating, inducing or contributing to the direct infringement of another 
person the court tried to harmonise indirect liability on the European level.122 Since 
Internet intermediaries act across the European boarders, it makes sense to have a 
harmonised indirect copyright liability regime. The case law of the CJEU in terms of 
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the right of communication to the public together with the safe harbour regimes of the 
E-commerce Directive leads to some harmonisation of secondary liability. The case 
law on the communication to the public right says when liability can be imposed on 
‘indirect’ infringers and the safe harbour regime says when this is not the case.123 
Nevertheless, this judge-made harmonisation could lead to legal uncertainties in 
European countries that already have a secondary liability regime, notably liability by 
authorisation in the UK or the German ‘Störerhaftung’.124 In fact, the TPB platform 
was blocked in most Member States under regimes of secondary or accessory 
liability.125 In the future, national courts have to assess situations like The Pirate Bay 
or Filmspeler through the lens of primary infringement – instead of indirect 
infringement. This might cause damage to the balance between primary and secondary 
liability in the national legislations.126 In addition, gaps will remain, since a safe 
harbour regime and CJEU’s interpretation of Article 3 of the Directive is not the same 
as a substantive secondary liability regime. For instance, the E-commerce Directive 
does not provide for a safe harbour for hyperlinking or peer-to-peer indexing sites. In 
cases that the knowledge requirement is not fulfilled, the national courts and legislation 
will have to deal with the question of secondary liability. Therefore, the decisions of 
the CJEU do not lead to a fully harmonised secondary liability regime.  
 
 
III. Select National Approaches  
As the CJEU emphasised, Member States are bound to the notion of communication 
to the public as it is set out by the CJEU.  They may not provide for a concept of 
communication to the public that is wider than the one at EU level.127 As shown above, 
the right has become increasingly complex over the years, which leads to legal 
uncertainty in the Member States. So far, there has not been a case before the CJEU 
concerning the question whether streaming platforms are communicating works to the 
public. Therefore, it is worth having a look at how national case law interprets the right 
of communication to the public. Besides the question of direct liability 
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(communication to the public), this subsection will analyse how the UK and Germany 




In Germany the Court of Appeal of Hamburg had to decide, in 2015, whether YouTube 
was directly liable for copyright infringing content that was posted by its users.128 With 
regard to the question whether YouTube was making available works to the public, 
the court held that the act of making available was conducted by its users and not by 
YouTube itself.129 Furthermore, the court assessed whether YouTube had adopted the 
content and was therefore directly infringing copyright. The idea behind that was that 
hosting providers who appropriate third party content can be made liable for the 
appropriated content as for its own content. The notion of adoption was developed in 
the marions-kochbuch.de decision130 by the German Federal Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)). In marions-kochbuch.de the key criteria were whether 
the host provider reviews the content, requires the user to grant comprehensive rights 
of exploitation, affixes its logo on the third party content and whether the content 
constitutes the core value of the website.131 In the YouTube case the Court of Appeal 
of Hamburg acknowledged that YouTube provides assistance for its users who view 
and upload the videos, such as the structuring of content in several categories but found 
that these acts were not sufficient for the finding of adoption.132 Under normal 
circumstances, a UGC host provider is not liable for the content of its users, if it is 
handled in an automated process and a disclaimer prevents the impression that the 
owner of the platform wants to appropriate the content.133 
 
In Germany, secondary liability is mainly dealt with through the principle of breach of 
duty of care – sometimes also called ‘interferer’ liability (‘Störerhaftung’).134 The 
principle of breach of duty of care is only aimed at injunctive orders against 
intermediaries but not claims for damages.135 For a breach of duty of care to occur 
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three requirements have to be met: (1) the secondary infringer has to have adequately 
contributed to that infringement, (2) the secondary infringer must have the legal 
possibility of preventing the principal infringement and (3) the secondary infringer 
must have violated a duty of care.136 A violation of such a duty of care requires an 
assessment whether the fulfilment of the duty of care was reasonable.137 It is 
unreasonable, if it would unduly impair the business of the ‘interferer’ or if the 
copyright infringement is not recognisable to the ‘interferer’.138 With regard to the 
duty to monitor the content that is posted onto the hosting provider’s platform the 
German Federal Court of Justice held that auction platforms like eBay do not have to 
monitor each and every article that is listed on their platform, because such an 
obligation would undermine the whole business model.139 A duty of care arises as soon 
as hosting providers are aware of copyright infringing content on their platforms. This 
knowledge is typically gained by a notice-and-takedown letter sent by the rights 
holder. After receiving such a letter the hosting provider must take the necessary 
measures to stop the infringement and has a duty of care to prevent the same type of 
infringement that are easily recognisable in the future.140  
In this context the BGH found that the file-host Rapidshare had to perform automatic 
as well as manual searches for future infringements after having received a takedown-
notice.141 In another case involving Rapidshare, the BGH held that Rapidshare has to 
monitor its content extensively and regularly for copyright infringing content, for 
instance, through automatic filters as well as employees who examine the content 
manually. The main reasons for this heightened and extensive obligation to monitor 
and actively search for infringing content was the fact that Rapidshare promoted the 
infringing use of its services by giving incentives to users who uploaded popular 
files.142  
 
In line with these decisions, the Court of Appeal of Hamburg held in the YouTube case 
that YouTube had to use an automatic filtering mechanism to prevent any future 
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infringement of content that had already been claimed through a takedown-notice. 
Therefore, YouTube was ordered to use its Content ID software itself, instead of 
leaving it to the right holders to use the software to detect copyright violation.143  Since 
Content ID is only capable of blocking identical files, YouTube was also ordered to 
implement a word filter, which checks the title and description of the uploaded files.144  
 
Besides the principle of breach of duty of care, German law also provides for other 
forms of secondary liability on the bases of general principles of tort law. Under §830 
of the German Civil Code (‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB’) participants to an 
infringement face the same liability as the direct infringer, i.e. they can also be held 
liable for damages. A participant is either an instigator or abetter. An instigator is 
anyone who incites unlawful acts of the direct infringer. An abetter is deliberately 
assisting to the direct infringement.145 However, liability as a participant requires 
contingent intent of the participant. Contingent intent requires that the participant 
seriously considered the risk of infringement and approvingly accepted it. This implies 
that the participant has to be positively aware of the act resulting in primary 
infringement, and of the person committing it.146 This requirement is not usually met 
by host providers. Therefore, host providers are rarely convicted for 
participatory/contributory liability in Germany.147 Another form of secondary liability 
is infringement by forbearance.148 This form of liability arises when the host provider 
consistently violates his duties of care.149 Such a liability has been accepted in a case 
where the host provider did not take any measures to stop the infringing activity even 
though it had received a takedown-notice.150  
 
German case law shows that UGC hosts such as YouTube or Dailymotion as well as 
file hosts such as nowvideo.sx or openload.co will most likely not be held liable for 
direct copyright infringement before a German court. Also, there will usually not be 
secondary infringement in the sense of instigation or abetting due to lack of contingent 
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intent. Such hosts will more likely face secondary liability on the basis of the principle 
of breach of duty of care. As stated above, this liability can substantiate orders for 
removal of the disturbance or injunctions concerning future conduct or orders to use 
automated filtering mechanisms as well as manual control mechanisms.  
 
Link-sharing and indexing streaming platforms are also most likely to be held liable 
in terms of breach of duty of care.	  Even without a notice-and-takedown letter, a duty 
of care can arise for link-sharing and indexing hosts, in particular if they increase the 
susceptibility of their services by, for example, advertising the rights-infringing use of 
their services. Link-sharing or indexing platforms often set up categories like ‘cinema 
films’ or ‘current series’ (e.g. 123movies.com) and thus, at least indirectly, promote 
the infringing use of their services151. In this case, duties of care would arise even in 
the absence of a takedown-notice. Furthermore, streaming platforms that promote the 
use of illegally hosted content or use categories susceptible to infringements are also 
likely to be held liable for participatory infringement, since contingent intent will be 
easier to substantiate in these cases. In addition, these platforms are often consistently 
violating their duties of care and can thus be held liable for infringement by 
forbearance.  
With regard to streaming box distributors currently no case law exists in Germany. 
However, considering the more defensive approach of German courts when it comes 
to primary liability, it is likely that they would have found streaming box distributors 
liable under the principle of breach of duty of care and not for primary copyright 
infringement. However, since the decision of the CJEU in the Filmspeler case is 
binding for the courts of Member States, German courts will have to assess the liability 
of streaming box distributors through the lens of primary infringement.152 
 
2. United Kingdom 
In contrast to German case law, courts in the UK follow a more expansive approach 
when it comes to direct liability of hosting providers in form of communicating works 
to the public. Furthermore, courts focus on the legal tools of secondary liability in the 
form of authorisation and joint tortfeasance.153 
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Primary infringement of a host provider has been found in the Newzbin (No.1) case154. 
Newzbin was a Usenet indexing site, which facilitated access to content on Usenet. It 
indexed binary files and offered the results through a search engine, which located and 
categorised the files in categories such as ‘Movies’ or ‘Music’. In addition, it allowed 
the files to be downloaded with a suitable newsreader.155 The High court held that the 
operators of the site were liable for communicating the infringing works to the public 
under	  s 20(2)(b) of the	  Copyright Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988, authorising 
acts of infringement by its users and being a join tortfeasor in those infringements.156 
With regard to the question whether Newzbin had communicated works to the public 
the court referred to CJEU’s judgement in the SGAE case157. It pointed out that the 
service of Newzbin is ‘not remotely passive. Nor does it simply provide a link to a 
film of interest which is made available by a third party.’158 The court emphasised that 
the service was offered upon payment to premium members of a weekly subscription 
free and in full knowledge of the consequences of its actions.159 This reasoning is in 
line with the decision in SGAE and the more recent decisions of the CJEU in terms of 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive.  
 
In terms of authorisation, section 16 of the CDPA states that copyright is infringed by 
a person who, inter alia, authorises another person to do any act restricted by that 
copyright without the licence of the copyright owner. The High Court defines 
‘authorisation’ as ‘the grant or purported grant of the right to do the act complained 
of. It does not extend to mere enablement, assistance or even encouragement.’160 In 
this regard, several aspects were considered. It was emphasised that Newzbin provides 
the means for infringement and controls them. Moreover, Newzbin had not installed a 
filtering system to prevent infringement actively encouraged its editors to make reports 
on movies and rewarded such activity.161 
In considering whether Newzbin was liable as a joint tortfeasor, it was held that mere 
assistance or facilitation of the primary infringement is not enough. The joint tortfeasor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin UK EWHC 608 (Ch). 
155 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin UK EWHC 608 (Ch) at paras 2-13. 
156 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin UK EWHC 608 (Ch) at para 126. 
157 See Chapter 3 II. 1. 
158 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin UK EWHC 608 (Ch) at para 125. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin UK EWHC 608 (Ch) at para 90. 
161 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Newzbin UK EWHC 608 (Ch) at paras 98 – 102. 
	   35	  
must involve himself in the copyright infringement as to make it his own.162 The court 
found that the structure of the site was promoting infringement by making it easy for 
users to find and download specific movies and music at the click of a button. Thus, it 
was held that Newzbin procured and engaged in a common design with its users to 
infringe copyright.163 
 
In contrast to the Newzbin case, subsequent case law in the UK only dealt with the 
liability of host providers incidentally, as a requirement for issuing blocking orders 
against access providers. Section 97A(1) of the CDPA permits injunctions against 
service providers where such had actual knowledge of a third party using its services 
to infringe copyright. Section 97A of the CDPA implements Article 8(3) of the Infosoc 
Directive.164 Section 97A of the Act gives right holders the possibility of applying for 
an injunction against access providers to block access of their customers to target sites 
that infringe copyright. Four requirements have to be met: (1) the respondents are 
service providers; (2) the users and/or the operators of the target websites infringe 
copyright; (3) the users and/or the operators of the target websites use the services of 
the Respondents to do that; and (4) the respondents have actual knowledge of this.165 
 
While the High Court found Newzbin liable for direct infringement, it did not even 
address primary infringement in a case against ‘The Pirate Bay’.166 In contrast to the 
ruling of the CJEU, it concluded that only the users of the site were infringing the 
copyright owners’ reproduction right and the right of communication to the public. 
TBP was only held as a joint tortfeasor and for authorisation. However, in a series of 
cases involving streaming sites, UK courts held these sites liable for communicating 
works to the public.167 
 
For instance, in FAPL v Sky the live sports streaming site FirstRow1.eu was held liable 
for communicating works to the public. The court argued that the website employed 
moderators who vet and index the submissions made by third party streamers. 
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Furthermore, the website gave the impression that it was open to submissions of links 
by any member of the public but instead sourced links to streams from a number of 
existing trusting streamers.168 Therefore, the court held that FirstRow’s level of 
involvement meant that FirstRow itself was communicating works to the public.  
In Paramount v Sky 1 the England High Court had to decide whether the link-sharing 
streaming platforms ‘SolarMovie’ and ‘TubePlus’ could be held liable for copyright 
infringement. Similar to FirstRow, the court observed that the sites make sure that the 
links to the streams are comprehensively categorised, referenced, moderated and 
searchable. Furthermore, the site operators controlled the quality of the submitted 
links.169 Therefore, the court concluded that the combined effects of the acts do amount 
to communication to the public.170  
 
It should be noted that all of these cases only examined whether blocking orders 
against access providers could be issued, thus they only addressed the liability of the 
streaming hosts indirectly. Furthermore, the High Court left it somewhat open whether 
the streaming sites infringed the right of communication to the public and relied on 
secondary liability which was definitely established (‘[…] even if that is wrong and 
the operators do not themselves carry out the act of communication to the public, 
[…]’171).  
 
From the above the following conclusions can be reached for streaming platforms and 
streaming box distributors. With regard to link-sharing platforms, UK case law shows 
that the degree of involvement of the platform plays a crucial role when determining 
whether they communicate works to the public themselves. If they provide editorial 
oversight over the submitted links such as categorising, referencing or moderating the 
submission, they will most likely be held liable for primary infringement. In any case, 
streaming platforms which submit the links themselves are content providers and are 
thus liable as primary infringers.172  The degree of editorial oversight determines the 
liability for authorisation or joint tortfeasance in the same way.  
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With regard to file hosts streaming platforms who merely provide Internet storage and 
a video player, no case law exists in the UK. Considering the more passive role of such 
hosts and the possibility of non-infringing use, it does not seem likely, however, that 
a UK court would hold them liable for damages as a primary or secondary infringer 
but rather order injunctions under section 97A of the Act. Also with regards to the 
copyright liability of UGC platforms, to date, no UK case law exists. It is not clear in 
how far mainstream streaming platforms such as YouTube or Dailymotion would be 
held liable for copyright infringements of their users. However, it is worth noting that 
eBay was neither held liable as a primary infringer nor as a secondary infringer for 
trademark infringements of its users.173 This indicates at least the tendency not to hold 
mainstream host providers liable.   
No court in the UK has dealt with the liability of streaming box distributors. As 
mentioned above, the CJEU’s ruling in the Filmspeler case is binding. Thus, UK courts 
would have to consider primary liability. Furthermore, UK courts would most likely 
find a streaming box distributor, such as the distributor of the Filmspeler, liable for 
authorisation and joint tortfeasance.  
 
IV. The hosting safe harbour of the E-Commerce Directive 
Section 4 (articles 12 to 15) of the E-Commerce Directive introduced a special 
intermediary liability framework. It provides for a cluster of conditional exemptions 
from liability for internet intermediaries. These limitations of liability apply to internet 
intermediaries providing services consisting of mere conduit, caching and hosting. 
They are established in a horizontal manner, meaning that they cover liability for all 
types of illegal activities, including copyright infringement. However, they only apply 
as regards to damages and do not affect the possibility of a national court or 
administrative authority to require a service provider to terminate or prevent an 
infringement.174 The limitations were introduced to ensure the provision of basic 
services which safeguard the continued free flow of information in the network and to 
ensure the development of the internet and e-commerce in the EU.175 
For the purposes of this thesis the hosting safe harbour, which is implemented in 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, is most relevant and will thus be analysed 
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below. Article 14 protects providers of an information society service ‘that consists of 
the storage of information provided by a recipient on the service’. 
 
1. Requirements for safe harbour under article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive 
To benefit from the safe harbour provision, one must first qualify as a provider of 
‘information society services’. Information society services are defined as ‘any service 
normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the 
individual request of a recipient of services.’176 ’"At a distance" means that the service 
is provided without the parties being simultaneously present’.177 ‘"At the individual 
request of a recipient of services" means that the service is provided through the 
transmission of data on individual request.’178 With regard to the requirement that the 
service is ‘normally provided for remuneration’ recital 18 of the E-Commerce 
Directive states that the safe harbour regime also covers services ‘which are not 
remunerated by those who receive them’, ‘in so far as they represent an economic 
activity’. This means that also providers, which offer their services for free and 
generate revenue through advertising, can qualify as information service providers.179 
Therefore, UGC, link-sharing and indexing streaming platforms, which mostly gain 
revenue from advertising, are not screened out from the concept of information society 
providers. 
In order to enjoy safe harbour protection, host providers in terms of Article 14 must 
(1) ‘not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims 
for damages, not [be] aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity 
or information is apparent; or’ (2) ‘upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.’180 With regard to the 
knowledge requirement, Article 15 of the E-Commerce has to be considered, which 
prohibits Member States from imposing a general obligation on providers ‘to monitor 
the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek 
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.’ Thus, the most common way for a 
host provider to obtain actual knowledge or awareness will be a notice of the right 
holders. The hosting safe harbour, therefore, relies heavily on the concept of notice-
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and-takedown, however, without providing for rules that regulate the notice-and-




2. The safe harbour effect on streaming host providers and streaming box 
distributors 
 
a. UGC and file host streaming platforms 
UGC streaming platforms like YouTube or Dailymotion qualify as information service 
providers, because they provide services for remuneration, at a distance by electronic 
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services. As shown above, the fact 
that they usually provide their service at no charge does not mean that it is not a service 
provided for remuneration. It is sufficient that they make economic gains through their 
activity, in particular, through advertising.182 Furthermore, UGC hosts provide on-
demand streaming and therefore provide their services at the individual request of their 
recipients.183  
The first criteria that explicitly regards hosting, is that the provider provides services 
that ‘consist of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’. The 
CJEU defined storage	  as simply meaning to hold ‘in memory on its server, certain 
data.’184 UGC streaming platforms should generally meet this requirement, since they 
business consists of the storage of media content uploaded by its users. The more 
interactive role of such UGC platforms does not affect this. The CJEU affirmed that 
in its Netlog decision185, where it held that a social networking platform was a host 
provider in the sense of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive.  
 
The question that remains is whether UGC platforms meet the so called ‘neutrality 
test’. This test was developed by the CJEU in its Google France judgement. It 
explained that the immunity of Article 14 does not apply to all service providers but is 
limited to service providers that are ‘intermediary service providers’ as stated in the 
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title of section 4 (Articles 12-15).186 In order to qualify as an ‘intermediary service 
provider’ the activity (e.g. storage) of the information society service provider has to 
be ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the service 
provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is 
transmitted or stored’187.  
 
Does that mean that UGC platforms such as YouTube or Dailymotion lose safe 
harbour protection, since they make available tools for uploading content, categorise 
and display it? The answer is most likely no. In L’Oréal, a case involving trademark 
infringements, the CJEU stated that ‘the mere fact that the operator of an online 
marketplace stores offers for sale on its server, sets the terms of its service, is 
remunerated for that service and provides general information to its customers cannot 
have the effect of denying it the exemptions from liability’188 This indicates that 
Article 14 does not require complete passivity from a host provider. It can be assumed 
that UGC platforms are considered to be neutral as long as they do not contribute to 
the creation of the relevant content or provide assistance geared at optimising the 
presentation of or promoting that content.189 This also seems to be the approach taken 
by the national courts of the Member States.190 Thus, whether a UGC streaming 
platform enjoys safe harbour protection depends on the specific facts relating to the 
structure and operation of the site. However, one can say that, under normal 
circumstances, the mainstream UGC streaming hosts should be shielded by Article 14 
of the E-Commerce Directive, as they usually merely provide abstract advice or an 
automatic technical process to organise the content. In such cases the host providers 
do not have knowledge nor are they aware of facts or circumstances from which the 
illegal activity or information is apparent. The same will apply to file hosts who merely 
provide internet storage and a streaming player. Their role is even more passive than 
the one of UGC platforms, as they do not provide for a search function or 
categorisation. As long as they comply with takedown-notices, they arguably enjoy 
protection in terms of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive.  
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b. Link-sharing and link-indexing streaming platforms 
Link-sharing and indexing hosts could qualify for safe harbour protection, depending 
on the structure of the site and the specific facts of the case. If they are structured as 
providing a platform where users can submit links to streaming content, they provide 
services that ‘consist of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the 
service’, thus, are host providers within the meaning of Article 14 of the E-Commerce 
Directive. Depending on whether their services are of a mere technical, automatic and 
passive nature, they can benefit from the safe harbour. However, many link-sharing 
and indexing streaming platforms, such as 123movies.com or alluc.ee, focus 
exclusively on linking to copyrighted material. These sites most likely cannot claim 
that they did not know that they were linking to infringing material. Therefore, they 
will have actual knowledge of illegal activity or at least be aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent. Thus, they do 
not fulfil the safe harbour requirements of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. 
Moreover, if such a site were to truly comply with takedown notices, almost all of its 
content would have to be taken down. There would not be any a reason to keep the site 
running.191 
 
c. Streaming box distributors	   
Recital 18 of the E-Commerce Directive makes clear that information society services 
cover a wide range of economic activities which take place online. However, activities 
such as the delivery of goods as such or the provision of services offline are not 
covered.192 Therefore, the distribution of a streaming box does not constitute an 
information society service. The E-Commerce safe harbours do thus not apply. In 
addition, that service does not ‘consist of the storage of information provided by a 
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CHAPTER 4. COMPARISON TO THE LIABILITY OF STREAMING 
PLATFORMS AND STREAMING BOX DISTRIBUTORS IN THE U.S.  
 
The U.S. copyright law is contained in chapters 1 through 8 and 10 through 12 of title 
17 of the United States Code. It recognises both primary liability and secondary 
liability for copyright infringement. It grants the copyright owner the following 
exclusive rights: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work, (2) to prepare derivative works 
based upon the copyrighted work, (3) to distribute copies of the work, (4) to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly, (5) to display the copyrighted work publicly and (6) to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.193 
Anyone who does any act, which the owner has the exclusive right to do, without the 
permission of the copyright owner, infringes copyright (primary liability).194  
While there is some discussion about whether 17 U.S.C. § 106 (‘[…]to do and to 
authorize any of the following […]’) provides the statutory basis for secondary 
lability195, it is accepted that U.S. case law generally recognises three types of 
secondary copyright liability, namely ‘contributory liability’, ‘vicarious liability’ and 
‘inducement liabiltiy’.196 The difference between contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability has been aptly described by the court in Demetriades v. Kaufmann 
by stating that ‘benefit and control are the signposts of vicarious liability’ and 
‘knowledge and participation the touchstones of contributory liability.’197 In the 
following the different forms of liability will be outlined and applied to streaming 
platforms and streaming box distributors.  
 
I. Primary liability  
As shown above, and unlike European copyright law, U.S. copyright law does not 
explicitly provide for a ‘communication to the public’ and ‘making available’ right. 
Yet, the U.S., as a contracting party of the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, is required 
to implement these rights into national law. The US Copyright Office, however, 
concluded that the exclusive rights set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106 comprise the substance 
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of the communication to the public and making available right.198 Within the context 
of Internet streaming platforms and streaming box distributors, the rights of 
distribution, public performance and public display are relevant. At the outset it must 
be stressed that liability of UGC as well as file host streaming platforms for direct 
copyright infringement  is improbable. This is because courts have held that for direct 
copyright infringement some element of volition or causation is required.199 Volition 
is ‘the faculty or power of using one’s will’200. In Perfect 10 v Giganews the Ninth 
Circuit held that if a defendant is ‘passively storing material at the direction of users 
in order to make that material available to other users upon request, or automatically 
copying, storing, and transmitting materials upon instigation by others’ the 
requirement of volition is not met.201 In light of this judgement, it seems unlikely that 
mainstream UGC platforms such as YouTube or file hosts will be held liable for direct 
copyright infringement as they merely provide storage space.  
 
 
1. Right of Distribution 
According to 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), the copyright owner has the exclusive right ‘to 
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending’. It is generally accepted that the 
right of distribution also encompasses the transmission of digital files and it not limited 
to conveyance of tangible objects.202 Distribution requires an actual dissemination of 
a copy.203 The Act defines copies as material objects, other than phonorecords, in 
which a work is fixed.204 With regard to streaming it is questionable whether a ‘fixed 
copy’ is created, since the data is ‘buffered’, i.e. it is temporarily stored in the cache 
and not permanently saved on the user’s computer.205 In a case that addressed the issue 
of whether or not the loading of software programs into random-access memory 
(RAM) constitutes a copy, the Ninth Circuit held that for the purposes of the 
reproduction right such digital information temporarily stored in the RAM constitutes 
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a copy.206 However, this case did not consider the question whether offering streams 
constitutes a distribution. This issue was, however, addressed in United States v. 
ASCAP207. The court distinguished between the situation of an Internet stream, where 
no permanent copy is made, and a download, which includes the making of a copy and 
concluded that a pure Internet stream does not infringe the right of distribution but 
rather affects the right of public performance and display.208 Thus, distinguishing 
whether a host provider merely offers a stream or additionally offers the possibility to 
download the content may determine whether there is a distribution at all.209  
 
With regard to link sharing and indexing streaming platforms who do not host the 
content themselves, the ‘server test’ developed by the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v 
Amazon.com has to be noted. Under the ‘server test’, only the person who hosts content 
on its servers and then makes it available to the public may be deemed to have 
distributed or displayed copies of the works.210 A website that shares links or indexes 
links merely provides HTML instructions that direct a user's browser to another site 
where the content is hosted. Providing these instructions is therefore not equivalent to 
showing or distributing a copy.211 Thus, as long as link-sharing or indexing streaming 
platforms do not host files on their own server, they may escape liability of direct 
infringement of the distribution right. The same applies to streaming box distributors. 
The add-ons installed on those streaming boxes only provide hyperlinks to other 
websites who either host or link to streaming content.  
 
2. The public performance right 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) the copyright owner has the right, ‘in the case of literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly’. Public 
performance of a work includes transmitting or otherwise communicating a 
performance to the public.212 ‘Publicly’ means ‘at a place open to the public or at any 
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and 
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its social acquaintances is gathered’.213 In United States v. ASCAP the court addressed 
the issue of music streaming and concluded that it constitutes a public performance. It 
held that the definition of ‘transmit’ includes all conceivable forms and combinations 
of wires and wireless communications media. Thus, also new forms of communicating 
works such as streaming are covered by the public performance right.214 Furthermore, 
when assessing whether a stream is a public performance, it is not relevant whether 
users actually received the work. The offer of a stream is sufficient.215 Another issue 
has been the question whether on-demand streaming can qualify as ‘public’ 
performance, since the streams are delivered separately to individual recipients.  The 
Supreme Court resolved the issue in its 2014 decision in American Broadcasting v 
Aereo216 where it held that on-demand streaming constitutes a ‘public’ performance, 
notwithstanding the fact that Aereo transmitted the work to individual subscribers. 
Aereo was a company that allowed its subscribers to view over-the-air television via 
live-streams or time-shifted streams. The subscribers could individually select which 
streams they want to watch. After selecting a stream, Aereo’s system, consisting of 
thousands of small antennas and a transcoder transmitted the work onto the user’s 
device.217 With regard to the ‘public’ requirement the court argued that an ‘entity may 
transmit a performance through one or several transmissions, where the performance 
is of the same work’. Thus, the performance at issue is not the individual transmission, 
but the underlying broadcast of the work itself. This broadcast was communicated to 
an indeterminate number of people, regardless of the number of discrete 
communications.218 With regard to the question whether Aereo performed, Aereo 
argued that they simply provide the equipment to stream the broadcast and that it is 
the subscriber who chooses which program he wants to watch and at what time he 
wants to watch it. The court dismissed this argument by emphasising the 
‘overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments.219’  
 
What is clear from the above is that UGC streaming platforms or streaming file hosts, 
who host the content on their own servers, are performing works publicly within the 
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meaning of 17 U.S.C. 106(4).220 However, as stated above under Chapter 4Cha I., 
these sites will most likely not meet the volitional conduct requirement. With regard 
to link-sharing and link indexing platforms, the situation is not as clear. Under the 
Ninth Circuit ‘server test’ those sites would not be liable for direct infringement of the 
public performance or display right since they do not host the content themselves. 
Although the court in Perfect 10 v Amazon.com had to decide whether the public 
display right was infringed, the server test is also applicable to the public performance 
right.221 However, it should be noted that this case was dealing with a search engine 
(Google) which inline linked images from another website and displayed them on their 
website.222 The outcome of the case could have been different had it involved 
streaming platforms who inline link and embed videos which were almost entirely 
uploaded without the authorization of the copyright owners. These sites seem less like 
a neutral search engine, such as Google, and more like an infringement tool.223 In 
addition, it should be noted that the ‘server test’ has been rejected by lower courts but 
was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals.224  
Moreover, the finding of Aereo’s direct liability does not affect the liability of such 
streaming platforms since Aereo used their own servers to transmit the broadcasts.  
Streaming box distributors do not host content themselves. They merely provide add-
ons on their streaming boxes which contain hyperlinks to websites who host or link to 
infringing content. Therefore, the legal assessment in terms of link-sharing and 
indexing sites applies equally to streaming box distributors.  
 
3. The right of public display 
Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) the copyright owner has the right to display a work publicly 
or to authorise another person to do so. To ‘display’ a work means ‘to show a copy of 
it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or 
process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show 
individual images nonsequentially’.225 This definition of display distinguishes it from 
performing a work, which is defined as ‘to show its images in any sequence or to make 
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the sounds accompanying it audible’.226 However, nothing changes with regard to the 
issue of streaming. Therefore, reference is made to the examination of the public 
performance right in the previous sub-section.   
 
 
II. Secondary liability 
Although the Copyright Act does not contain a provision according to which someone 
is liable for a copyright infringement carried out by another person, secondary liability 
constitutes common-law doctrines that gives rise to liability of indirect infringers.227 
In the following, different forms of secondary liability - vicarious, contributory and 
inducement liability - will be outlined. 
 
1. Vicarious liability 
Vicarious liability is found when there has been a direct infringement and the 
defendant, firstly, had a direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted 
material and, secondly, had the right and ability to control the infringing conduct.228 
Importantly, awareness of the infringing conduct is not a requirement.229 
Someone who participates in the revenues of the direct infringer will derive a direct 
financial benefit. However, most streaming platforms who offer unauthorised streams 
will gain revenue through advertising. Until now, courts have acknowledged different 
cases of ‘indirect financial benefit’ giving rise to vicarious liability. In A&M Records 
v Napster, for instance, the court concluded that Napster, a file-sharing platform, was 
benefitting from the infringements of their users because the availability of infringing 
material acts as a 'draw' for future customers.230 What is noteworthy is the fact that the 
court even took into account future financials benefits. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios v Grokster, another case involving a peer-to-peer filesharing software, the 
Court of Appeal states that ‘direct financial benefit, by advertising revenue are 
undisputed in this case’, since 90% of the files that were shared between the users 
using the Grokster software were copyright protected.  
 
The vast majority of UGC, file host, link-sharing and indexing streaming platforms 
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offer their services for free and gain financial benefit from advertising.231 As shown in 
the Napster and Grokster cases, advertisement revenues can be sufficient when the 
infringing material acts as a ‘draw’ for future users.  
 
As for the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct, the defendant must 
have the practical and legal ability to control its users.232 Before uploading a video on 
a UGC platform, such as YouTube, a user usually has to sign up. In these cases the 
UGC platforms do have the ability to block a user. They are also able to monitor files 
that were uploaded onto their platform. As a result, it is argued here that streaming 
platforms must monitor their content as well as block users to escape imposition of 
vicarious liability.233 
 
2. Contributory liability 
Contributory liability stems from the tort law principle that one who directly 
contributes to another’s tort should also be held liable.234 According to this principle, 
a party who knows about the infringement and ‘induces, causes, or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct’ is liable for contributory infringement.235  
 
With regard to the knowledge requirement, actual knowledge and constructive 
knowledge are sufficient.236 A party has constructive knowledge if he or she has reason 
to know that an infringement is taking place.237 In the landmark decision Sony v 
Universal City Studios238 the U.S. Supreme Court further developed the knowledge 
requirement. According to the court, constructive knowledge could only be established 
if the service of the defendant was not capable of substantial non-infringing use (so 
called ‘Sony defence’).239 If the service or product is capable of non-infringing use, 
the plaintiff has to proof that the defendant ‘had specific knowledge of infringement 
at a time when they contributed to the infringement and failed to act upon that 
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information.’240 However, the defendant can still be held liable, if he cannot provide 
evidence for actual non-infringing use.241 This means that a contributory infringer 
cannot obtain immunity by using encryption to avoid knowledge.  
 
UGC and file host streaming platforms provide an infrastructure for storing and 
displaying information. In addition, UGC platforms usually also provide for a search 
function to locate the copyrighted files. Therefore, they materially contribute to the 
infringing conduct. The same applies to link-sharing and link indexing platforms and 
streaming box distributors. Thus, the finding of contributory liability will depend on 
the knowledge requirement. As UGC and file host streaming platforms run 
automatically, they will most likely not have actual knowledge. Moreover, 
constructive knowledge would require that these sites are not capable of non-infringing 
uses. As streaming boxes are also capable of non-infringing uses, the knowledge 
requirement will be hard to substantiate for the plaintiff. With regard to link-sharing 
and link indexing platforms, actual knowledge and constructive knowledge seems to 
be easier to substantiate, since the majority of these sites are designed to facilitate 
access to copyright protected works.242  
 
3. Inducement liability 
As shown above, constructive knowledge cannot be construed if the defendant’s 
service or product is capable of substantial non-infringing use and if the defendant 
does not have specific knowledge of the infringement.243 However, this does not mean 
that a party cannot be held liable for secondary infringement. In Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios v Grokster the U.S. Supreme held that ‘one who distributes a device 
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression 
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts 
of infringement by third parties.’244 Therefore, wilful blindness does not protect from 
secondary liability, if one distributes a device or service with the intent to induce 
copyright infringement.245  
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Another case where a defendant has been hold liable because of inducement is 
Columbia Pictures Industries v Fung246. Gary Fung was the operator of several 
BitTorrent indexing sites similar to The Pirate Bay247. The Ninth Circuit observed that 
Fung had promoted the use of his BitTorrent sites to infringe copyright by encouraging 
his users to upload torrent files concerning copyrighted content and by, for example, 
providing a ‘list of “Box Office Movies,” containing the 20 highest-grossing movies 
then playing in U.S. theaters.’248 The court concluded that the websites of Fung were 
designed to direct users to copyright infringing material, therefore, he has the intent to 
induce copyright infringement.249  
 
With regard to link-sharing and link indexing streaming platforms the situation seems 
to be similar, at least for the majority of sites who collect links and index links to 
copyright protected material. However, they would also have to induce their users to 
infringe copyright. As pointed out under Chapter 4 I.1., it is not always clear whether 
end-users who watch streams infringe the copyright owner’s right of reproduction, 
since temporary storage takes place in the RAM. Thus, no copy of the work remains 
stored on the end-user’s computer.250 Yet, users definitely infringe copyright by 
uploading content onto host sites. In as far as streaming platforms encourage their 
users to upload copyright protected material by, for example, specifically requesting 
their users to upload or post links to movies or television programs, they are most 
likely liable under the inducement rule.  
 
With respect to streaming box distributors, marketing efforts that highlight the access 
to copyright protected material which was uploaded without the authorisation of the 
copyright owner, would likely meet the standards of inducement. However, there must 
be an underlying direct infringement. The streaming platforms to which the streaming 
box provides access are probably infringing copyright but the distributors are not 
inducing them to infringe copyright by selling streaming boxes to their customers. The 
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customers who watch unauthorised streams are arguably not infringing at all.251 
 
III. The DMCA Safe Harbour Provisions 
In 1998, the ‘Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act’ was enacted as 
part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).252 17 U.S.C. § 512 sets out the 
conditions under which online service providers (OSPs) are exempted from liability. 
Unlike the E-Commerce Directive, the DMCA governs liability ‘vertically’, meaning 
that it does not deal with liability of intermediaries across all types of content but only 
lays down rules for the special domain of copyright law.253 For the purposes of this 
thesis, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) and (d) are of interest. Section § 512(c) provides for 
limitation of liability for ‘Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction 
of Users’. This section applies, in particular, to UGC streaming platforms and file host 
streaming platforms. With respect to link-sharing and link indexing streaming 
platforms, section § 512(d) applies. In the following, the general requirements will be 
briefly discussed together since both sections have basically the same requirements 
and are similar to the hosting safe harbour provision of the E-Commerce Directive.  
 
1. General Requirements for Safe Harbour Protection under 17 U.S.C § 512(c) 
and (d) 
First, one must qualify as an OSP, which is defined in § 512(k) as a ‘provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor’. Next, the OSP must 
‘not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the 
system or network is infringing’. 254 In the case that the OSP does not have actual 
knowledge, it must not be aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent.255 If the OSP obtains knowledge – usually through a takedown-
notice – of the infringing activity or of facts from which the activity is apparent, it 
must remove or disable access to the material expeditiously.256 In a case where an OSP 
has the right and ability to control the activity of its users, it must not directly benefit 
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from it financially. 257 Finally, the OSP must have a designated an agent to receive 
notifications of claimed infringement and publish its contact information on its 
website.258 Just like the E-Commerce Directive, the DMCA clarifies that OSPs are not 
required to monitor their services or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing 
activity. 259 
 
2. The safe harbour provisions’ effect on streaming host providers and streaming 
box distributors 
It will be very difficult for a plaintiff to establish actual knowledge of a UGC streaming 
platform or file host. In Viacom v. YouTube260, a case involving several content owners 
(film studios, music publishers, television networks) who sued YouTube for direct and 
secondary copyright infringement, the Second Circuit clarified that actual knowledge 
requires that the OSP subjectively knew of specific infringement.261 The burden of 
proof relies on the plaintiff.262 It will be almost impossible for a plaintiff to prove such 
actual knowledge. Furthermore, ‘red-flag knowledge’, i.e. awareness of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, also requires that a specific 
and identifiable work is being infringed.263 This means that even though a UGC 
streaming platform might have knowledge that there is widespread copyright 
infringement on its platform, this alone does not suffice to establish knowledge of 
specific infringements.264 The typical UGC and file host streaming platforms will, 
therefore, mostly meet the requirement of not having actual knowledge.  
 
However, one could argue that such sites are vicariously liable because they benefit 
financially from the infringing activity and have the right and ability to control it. In 
this context, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff has to show ‘something more’ 
than the power to remove or block access to material posted on its website.265 
‘Something more’ would be a detailed instruction to users about what content to 
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upload or editing the content.266 Eventually, the court held that YouTube can rely on 
the safe harbour in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). Thus, UGC or file host streaming platforms 
who correspond to takedown-notices and do not induce or participate in infringing 
activities are protected under the safe harbour regime of the DMCA.  
 
Whether link-sharing or indexing streaming platforms can rely on 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) 
depends on the structure of the site. When such a site, similar to UGC streaming 
platforms, is purely run by its users and does not induce its users to link to copyright 
protected material or merely provides links that give access to infringing works, it may 
qualify for safe harbour protection. However, many link-sharing and indexing 
streaming platforms focus exclusively on linking to copyrighted material. These sites 
will most likely have actual knowledge of specific infringements or at least are aware 
of facts or circumstances from which the specific infringing activity is apparent.   
 
IV. Comparative considerations 
In both the EU and the U.S. the question whether streaming platforms can be held 
liable for copyright infringement depends on judge-made law. This is remarkable with 
regard to EU copyright law, which is mostly influenced by civil law countries, since 
judge-made law is usually associated with common law systems.267 In the EU, primary 
liability of host providers or other third parties is assessed through an examination of 
the communication to the public right, including the making available right under 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. As mentioned above, U.S. copyright law does not 
explicitly provide for a ‘communication to the public’ and ‘making available’ right. 
Yet, according to the Copyright Office and a majority of scholars, the substance of the 
making available right is incorporated in the exclusive rights set out in 17 U.S.C. § 
106.268  
 
However, the CJEU seems to follow a more expansive approach when it comes to 
finding intermediaries or third parties liable for primary infringement of the 
communication to the public right. This is mainly due to the fact, that secondary 
liability is not harmonised on EU level, which is arguably why the CJEU tries to 
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achieve further harmonisation in this area by expanding the notion of communication 
to the public and making available.269 Thus, cases in the EU, which are analysed under 
the rubric of primary infringement, would be addressed as potential secondary 
infringements in the U.S. In the following, some cases will be analysed that are of 
particular importance in the context of streaming platforms and streaming box 
distributors, and which illustrate the different approaches. 
 
1. Link indexing sites and link-sharing sites 
As discussed above, the CJEU ruled in The Pirate Bay270 that by indexing user-
provided torrent files to content hosted by users that it knows to be infringing, and by 
providing a search function and categories to locate the files, TPB communicated 
works to the public and was therefore a primary infringer. The most likely analogous 
case would be Pictures Industries v Fung271, which also dealt with a BitTorrent 
indexing site. The Ninth Circuit did not even discuss primary infringement but held 
Fung liable as a secondary infringer for inducement. This seems to be the more natural 
approach, since the users of such torrent indexing sites are the direct infringers, 
whereas the platform is effectively only contributing to/ inducing these direct 
infringements.  
 
Another difference is that the Ninth Circuit also examined whether Fung could rely on 
one of the safe harbour provisions of the DMCA. By contrast, the CJEU in The Pirate 
Bay omitted any reference to the exemptions of the E-Commerce Directive and, in 
particular, the hosting safe harbour provision. The reason can be found in Recital 42 
and Article 14(2) of the E-Commerce Directive. These provisions indicate that the safe 
harbour provisions only relate to liability for providers for third party infringements, 
not for primary infringement of the provider itself.272 At first glance, this does not 
seem to make a big difference, since torrent indexing sites like TPB will most likely 
have ‘red-flag’ knowledge and can thus be held liable. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out that it ‘is conceivable that a service provider liable for inducement could 
be entitled to protection under the safe harbours’, and in such cases the different 
approaches would lead to different results.  
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With respect to the issue of linking, the CJEU decided that the provision of links can 
constitute the making available of a work to the public when it is used to circumvent 
restrictions of another website or if it provides access to copyrighted content that was 
uploaded without the consent of the copyright owner and the defendant has knowledge 
hereof.273 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court held that only the person who hosts 
content on its servers and then makes them available to the public may be deemed to 
directly infringe copyright.274 As a result, a platform who shares or indexes links can 
only be held secondary liable under U.S. copyright law. In this context, it should be 
noted that the required direct infringement is not always clear when it comes to end-
users watching streams.275 The distinction between primary and secondary liability 
may in many cases make little difference when some form of liability can be 
established under both jurisdictions. However, a significant difference between the EU 
and the U.S in terms of linking is the CJEU’s approach that knowledge of the 
infringing content/activity can be presumed when the defendant’s site is revenue 
generating.276 Such a presumption of knowledge does not exist under U.S. copyright 
law.277 Therefore, this creates a greater risk of liability for link-sharing and indexing 
platforms in the EU. In addition, U.S. copyright law provides for a ‘linking’ safe 
harbour278, whereas the E-Commerce Directive does not. 
 
2. Streaming Box Distributors  
The CJEU decided in the Filmspeler279 case that the distribution of a streaming box 
with preinstalled add-ons, which provides access to unauthorised streaming content, 
constitutes a communication to the public. Under U.S. law, however, this would either 
be a case of inducement liability or contributory liability. The key issue in terms of 
inducement is the underlying infringement. As already stated above, it is not clear 
whether users who watch streams do indeed infringe U.S. copyright law by 
reproducing the work, since such a reproduction is only temporary.280 The hosting 
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platforms definitely infringe copyright but are most likely not induced by the 
streaming box distributor. If end-users are not infringers, and the platforms are not 
induced281, only contributory liability is possible. A streaming distributor could be held 
liable if a plaintiff can show that a streaming distributor knows about the infringement 
of the unauthorised streaming platforms that the add-ons link to, and that it materially 
contributes to the infringement by directing its customers to the infringing platforms. 
However, it has to be noted that a plaintiff would have to proof that the defendant ‘had 
specific knowledge of infringement at a time when they contributed to the 
infringement and failed to act upon that information’.282  
 
3. UGC streaming platforms and file host streaming platforms 
Until now, no decisions exist on EU level concerning the liability of UGC or file host 
streaming platforms. It is not clear whether such platforms infringe the right of 
communication to the public, including the making available right, when its users 
upload copyright infringing material onto the site. As shown under Chapter 4 IV.1., 
the finding of primary liability would mean that such sites would not be able to rely 
on the hosting safe harbour regime. Therefore, it seems unlikely that at least the 
mainstream hosts, such as YouTube, which take active steps to minimise the risk of 
copyright right infringement283 and correspond to takedown notices, would be held 
liable for direct copyright infringement. Under U.S. law, at least the mainstream 
providers are protected by the DMCA safe harbour provisions as far as they correspond 
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CHAPTER 5:  LIABILITY OF STREAMING PLATFORMS AND 
STREAMING BOX DISTRIBUTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Copyright law in South Africa is provided for, and regulated by, the Copyright Act 98 
of 1978 (hereinafter the Act) and the Regulations285 under this Act. South African 
copyright law recognises primary and secondary infringement. It is primary when the 
infringer does, or authorises another person to do, any of the acts that fall within the 
listed exclusive rights.286 It is secondary when a person deals in infringing articles, for 
example when the person knowingly and without the consent of the copyright owner 
imports an already existing infringing copy, that he may not himself have 
reproduced.287 In the context of South African copyright law, a distinction must be 
made between indirect or secondary infringement and secondary or indirect liability. 
Secondary liability deals with the question whether a person is liable for direct 
copyright infringement of a third party, whereas secondary infringement occurs where 
a person deals in infringing works. The latter will not play a role for the purposes of 
this study.  
 
To date, there have been no cases decided by South African courts relating to 
secondary liability for copyright infringement online. As copyright infringement can 
also constitute a statutory delict, the general delictual principles concerning 
participation or joint tortfeasance may be applicable in relation to copyright 
infringement.288 Copyright scholars have suggested that secondary liability falls within 
the terms of section 23(1) of the Copyright Act, which extends liability to any person 
who ‘causes’ another person to do any of the exclusive acts.289 
 
I. Primary liability  
Sections 6 to 11 of the South African Copyright Act stipulate for each category of 
copyrighted works which acts may be done or authorised exclusively by the copyright 
owner. As a result, these rights differ from one category of works to another. At the 
outset, it should be noted that South Africa has up to now not introduced the rights of 
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‘communication to the public’ and ‘making available’, which were, elsewhere, 
specifically designed to grant copyright owners the right to better control the 
transmission of their works over the Internet.290 However, the introduction of such 
rights is currently discussed,  in connection with the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, 
for literary, musical, and artistic works; sound recordings and cinematograph films and 
audiovisual fixations.291 This will be analysed separately below.  
 
With regard to streaming platforms and streaming box distributors the relevant 
provisions are currently sections 6(c) [for literary and musical works], 8(1)(b) [for 
cinematograph films] and 9(e) [for sound recordings]. Before looking at these 
provisions in more detail, it is noteworthy, that the general right to broadcast a work292 
does arguably not apply to the distribution of works over the internet because it only 
covers the distribution by means of electromagnetic waves without an artificial 
conductor.293 Furthermore, it seems that the right to transmit a work in a diffusion 
service294 does also not apply in these cases. It only covers transmissions that take 
place over wires or other paths provided by material substance and thus does not 
encompass the dissemination of works over the Internet.295 
 
1. Right to perform a literary or musical work in public  
Section 6(c) provides for the exclusive right to perform literary and musical works in 
public. The Act does not define what public means. South African case law has pointed 
out, however, that the character of the audience is the crucial factor. It must be a large 
number of people that are unrelated or unknown to each other and it must be more than 
the domestic or quasi-domestic circle that has access to the provided service.296 
Streaming platforms can be accessed by anyone with an Internet connection. Thus, 
they are directed to the public. The question remains whether streaming platforms or 
streaming box distributors qualifies as “performing” works. The Act states that 
'perform' in relation to a work shall be construed accordingly to ‘performance’. 
Performance is defined as ‘any mode of visual or acoustic presentation of a work, 
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including any such presentation by the operation of a loudspeaker, a radio, television 
or diffusion receiver or by the exhibition of a cinematograph film or by the use of a 
record or by any other means […]’.297 Although the definition does not expressly 
mention the presentation of a work over the Internet, one could argue that modern 
forms of communicating works such as streaming should be read into the right to 
perform in public. However, the same issues and questions as in the context of U.S. 
copyright law and the public performance right would then arise in relation to South 
African copyright law (i.e. are services like on-demand covered and does the ‘server 
test’ apply?), see Chapter 4 I.2 above. In any event, it should be noted that the 
applicability with regard to streaming is rather limited since the right to perform in 
public only applies to musical and literary works. 
 
2. Right to cause a cinematograph film to be seen in public 
According to section 8(1)(b) the copyright owner of a cinematograph film has the 
exclusive right to do or to authorise the act of ‘causing the film, in so far as it consists 
of images, to be seen in public, or, in so far as it consists of sounds, to be heard in 
public’. Since the Act does not define the term ‘causing’, one could argue that any 
causal connection is sufficient. Then UGC, file host, link-sharing and indexing 
streaming platforms as well as streaming box distributors would, strictly speaking, all 
cause the film to be seen in public. However, this interpretation seems excessive in 
that it would even encompass the smallest contribution. It is more likely, therefore, 
that a South African court would interpret the provision in a way consistent with the 
interpretation of the ‘public display’ right by U.S. courts. As discussed in Chapter 4 
I.2., public display in the context of streaming requires the work to be hosted by the 
alleged infringer. Applying this standard to s8(1)(b), UGC and file host streaming 
platforms could be would cause films to be seen in public. Link-sharing, link-indexing 
platforms and streaming box distributors, however, do not host content themselves and 
are therefore not causing films to be seen in public.  
 
3. Communicating sound recordings to the public 
According to section 9(e) of the South African Copyright Act, the copyright owner of 
a sound recording has the exclusive right to communicate the sound recording to the 
public. The term ‘sound recording’ is defined as ‘any fixation or storage of sounds, or 
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data or signals representing sounds, capable of being reproduced, but does not include 
a sound-track associated with a cinematograph film’.298 
 
As the definition indicates, the right is of limited applicability in the context of 
streaming. It would only be applicable in terms of music streaming platforms. 
However, a South African court could apply the CJEU’s principles in terms of the 
communication to the public right. Although the wording of section 9(e) does not 
expressly include the ‘making available’ right, this right is usually put under the 
umbrella of the communication to the public right.299 Therefore, a court could interpret 
section 9(e) as to cover the making of works available to the public.300 Nevertheless, 
one should bear in mind that the extensive approach of the CJEU in terms of the 
communication to the public and making available right stems from the fact that 
copyright law, in particular secondary liability, is not fully harmonised on EU level.  
 
II. Secondary liability  
As previously stated, there have been no reported cases in South Africa which involved 
secondary liability of an Internet intermediary. Therefore, the principles of 
‘contributory liability’ or ‘inducement liability’ developed by U.S. case law have not 
been established under South African case law. Section 23(1) extends liability to 
persons who cause other persons to do any of the restricted acts. The term ‘cause’ is 
broad enough to include these principles of ‘contributory liability’ and ‘inducement 
liability’.301 Furthermore, whilst copyright is specifically protected in the Copyright 
Act, it is also protected by delictual law, as far as it does not conflict with the Copyright 
Act.302 The general common law principle that anyone who instigates, assists, or abets 
to the commission of a wrongdoing has been applied in the context of copyright law 
in Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence 303. In that case, one of the 
respondents co-operated with and assisted the other respondents in the copyright 
infringement of a computer program by providing parts of the source code. As a result, 
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he was also held liable for copyright infringement pursuant to section 23(1).304  
Moreover, South African law of delict also recognises vicarious liability, i.e. the strict 
liability of one person for the wrongdoing of another.305 Just as in U.S. law, it requires 
the right and ability to control the infringing conduct and a direct financial interest.306  
 
Under common law, instigating, assisting or abetting in the infringement of another 
person only leads to liability, however, if the secondary infringer knew or had reason 
to know that (s)he participated in a delictual wrong.307 On the other hand, where a 
person ‘causes’ another person to infringe copyright in terms of section 23(1) of the 
Act, knowledge is not required. This is a difference to the U.S. approach, where 
secondary liability requires some kind of knowledge. Therefore, in the case of UGC 
and file host streaming platforms as well as streaming box distributors, where it is 
difficult to substantiate knowledge under the U.S. ‘contributory infringement’ 
principles308, South African courts could apply a more extensive approach, since 
section 23(1) does not require knowledge of the unlawful conduct.  
 
III. Safe Harbour provisions in the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act of 2002 
In 2002, the South African parliament enacted the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act (ECTA). Chapter XI of the ECTA provides for liability exemptions 
for service providers. Service providers are persons providing information system 
services.309 Information system is defined as a ‘system for generating, sending, 
receiving, storing, displaying or otherwise processing data messages [which system] 
includes the Internet’.310 This definition encompasses those who perform the functions 
that make the Internet available to users, not everyone using the Internet.311 In order 
to avail itself of the liability exemptions, the service provider must meet two threshold 
requirements: (1) it must be a member of an industry representative body for service 
providers and (2) it must adopt and implement the official code of conduct of that 
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representative body.312 An industry representative body in terms of section 71 of the 
ECTA is, for example, the Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA). For the 
purposes of this thesis, the safe harbour provisions contained in section 75 (hosting) 
and section 76 (information location tool) are of importance. The safe harbour 
provisions are modelled on the DMCA safe harbour provisions. However, unlike the 
DMCA, they apply horizontally, meaning not only for copyright infringements. In the 
following, requirements of sections 75 and 76 will be outlined and applied to the 
different types of streaming services. 
 
1. Section 75: Hosting 
Section 75 indemnifies a service provider from damages for providing services that 
consist of the storage of data that is provided by a recipient of the service, as long as 
it does not have actual knowledge of the infringing information, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which the infringement is apparent and as long as he upon 
receipt of a takedown notification acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to 
the data.313  
 
2. Section 76: Information Location Tools 
Section 76 indemnifies a service provider from damages for referring or linking users 
to a web page containing infringing content by using information location tools, as 
long as it does not have actual knowledge of the infringing information, is not aware 
of facts or circumstances from which the infringement is apparent, does not receive a 
financial benefit from the infringing activity and removes, or disables access to, the 
reference or link to the infringing activity within a reasonable time after being 
informed of the infringing nature of the activity.314 
 
3. The notice-and-takedown procedure in section 77 
Section 77 of the ECTA sets out a detailed notice-and-takedown procedure. In terms 
of this procedure someone who has become aware of infringing activity may notify 
the service provider of the infringement and require it to remove or disable access to 
the unlawful content. Section 77(1) of the ECTA sets out the requirements for a valid 
notification. In order to minimise the likelihood of fraudulent notifications, section 
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77(2) of the ECTA states that anyone who notifies a service provider of unlawful 
activity and knows that the notification misrepresents the facts is liable for the damages 
caused by a wrongful takedown. Moreover, section 77(3) provides that a service 
provider cannot be held liable for a wrongful takedown in response to a notification. 
Just as the safe harbour provisions of the DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive, the 
ECTA’s safe harbour indemnities state that the service providers are not under a 
general obligation to monitor the data that they transmit.315  
 
4. Application to streaming services 
With regard to streaming platforms, the threshold requirement of being a member in 
an industry representative body for service providers should be noted. This 
requirement has the effect that only South African service providers within a closed 
group of the industry will typically qualify for the limitations.316 Therefore, most UGC, 
file host, link-sharing and indexing streaming platforms are not afforded protection 
from liability under the ECTA.317 In addition, as the majority of link-sharing and link-
indexing streaming platforms are linking to copyrighted content, they will most likely 
not meet the codes of conduct of the representative body. Notwithstanding the above, 
it is noteworthy that the hosting safe harbour provision of the ECTA does not require 
the host to not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity. 
Therefore, UGC or file host streaming platforms who profit directly from the 
infringing content can still qualify for immunity under section 75, as long as they 
comply with the notice-and-takedown procedure and do not have specific knowledge 
of the infringing activity. However, this does not apply to link-sharing and link-
indexing streaming platforms, since the ‘linking’ safe harbour provision in section 76 
of the ECTA states that such service providers are not allowed to receive a financial 
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IV. The Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 
In 2015, the Minister of Trade and Industry published a bill to extensively amend the 
Copyright Act of 1978.319 A revised version thereof was introduced to Parliament on 
16 May 2017.320 While the Bill has not been finalised at the time of writing this thesis, 
for the purposes of this study and with regard to the issue of unauthorised streaming, 
two specific proposed amendments are of particular interest. First, the Bill proposes to 
introduce new exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’ and ‘making available’ 
for literary, musical, and artistic works as well as cinematograph films, audiovisial 
fixations and sound recordings.321 Secondly, the Bill proposes to also introduce an 
exemption for temporary reproductions and adaption by inserting section 13A in the 
Copyright Act.  
 
1. Communication to the public 
The new exclusive right reads as follows:  
‘communicating the work to the public, by wire or wireless means, including by means 
of internet access and the making of the work available to the public in such a way 
that any member of the public may access the work from a place and at a time chosen 
by that person, whether interactively or non-interactively;’322 
 
The wording is very similar to Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), which 
was created to grant copyright owners the right to control the transmission of their 
works over the internet.323 As shown above, the wording of the current exclusive rights 
are outdated and do not really address new technologies such as streaming. Therefore, 
the introduction of such a communication to the public and making available right is 
necessary and welcome in order to bring South Africa’s copyright law in line with the 
digital era and cover new ways of disseminating works such as Internet TV, 
webcasting, video-on-demand and other streaming technologies. However, the 
numerous decisions of the CJEU in relation to the ‘communication to the public’ and 
‘making available’ right in Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive show the complexity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Copyright Amendment Bill 2015, available at https://publishsa.co.za/file/1495524950kzv-
copyrightamendmentbill.pdf (last accessed on 5 February 2018). 
320 Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, available at 
https://libguides.wits.ac.za/ld.php?content_id=32174808 (last accessed on 5 February 2018). 
321 Ibid.  
322 Copyright Amendment Bill 2017  
323 van der Merwe op cit (n290) 309; South Africa has signed the WCT but has not yet ratified it. 
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that right.324 For instance, the legal status of linking has been altered and amended in 
several decisions of the CJEU, which lead to legal uncertainty.325 
  
In contrast to the wording of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, the Bill adds that the 
person may access the work either ‘interactively or non-interactively’. This addition 
appears to be superfluous since the making available right covers interactive 
communication (on-demand streams) and non-interactive communication (e.g. 
webcasting) is covered by the communication to the public right.326  
 
2. Section 13A  
Section 13A of the Bill provides for an exception for temporary reproductions and 
adaptions. The exception reads as follows:  
Any person may make transient or incidental copies of a work, including reformatting an 
integral and essential part of a technical process, if the purpose of those copies or adaptations 
is  
(a) to enable the transmission of the work in a network between third parties by an intermediary 
or any other lawful use of the work; or 
(b) to adapt the work to allow use on different technological devices, such as mobile devices, 
as long as there is no independent economic significance to these acts. 
 
Until now, a difference between South African and European copyright law was the 
absence of an exception for ‘temporary/transient copies’ in South African law. The 
Bill now proposes to introduce such an exception through the insertion of section 
13A.327 Such an exception would affect streaming platforms as follows: In general, 
secondary liability requires a direct infringement of a third party. As discussed under 
Chapter 4 II., in the context of streaming platforms and streaming box distributors, it 
is not always clear whether their users actually infringe the right of reproduction 
because streaming data is only saved temporarily on the user’s computer. Section 13A 
allows temporary copies of works, if the only purpose of those copies is to enable the 
transmission of a work in a network between third parties by an intermediary or any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 IP Unit, ‘Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 Comments’ (2017) 10, available at 
https://libguides.wits.ac.za/ld.php?content_id=33935202.  
325 See Google SA ‘Submission on the Copyright Amendment Bill’ (2017), available at 
https://libguides.wits.ac.za/ld.php?content_id=33934566.  
326 E Papadaki ‘Hyperlinking, making available and copyright infringement: lessons from European 
national courts’ (2017) 8 EJLT 3. 
327 In EU copyright law Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive provides for an exception for  
temporary/transient copies.  
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other lawful use of the work. Thus, this could be interpreted as allowing users to stream 
media. Then again, contributory or inducement liability would be difficult to 
substantiate due to a lack of direct infringement by the users of streaming services. 
However, the Bill does not state what ‘lawful use of the work’ means. In the Filmspeler 
case, the CJEU held that the end user, who deliberately and in full knowledge of the 
circumstances streams unauthorised copyrighted content, cannot rely on the exception 
for temporary acts of reproductions, since it does not constitute a lawful use of the 
work.328 Whether this also applies to streaming media, where the infringing nature is 
not apparent, is, however, unclear.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems EU (CJEU) C-527/15 at para 69. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
This thesis has scrutinised the liability for copyright infringement of streaming 
platforms and streaming box distributors in the EU, U.S. and in South Africa. With 
regard to streaming platforms, this thesis has examined the liability of UGC, file host, 
link-sharing and link-indexing streaming platforms seperately. In all three jurisdictions 
link-sharing and link-indexing streaming platforms, which advertise the use of 
illegally hosted content or set up categories susceptible to infringements, are primary 
or secondary liable for copyright infringement. Other link-sharing and link-indexing 
platforms which adopt a more passive role may not be held liable. Here, it will be 
easier for platform operators to escape liability in the U.S. and South Africa, as these 
jurisdictions provide for a ‘linking’ safe harbour. At present, the liability of the more 
neutral UGC and file host streaming platforms under European and South African 
copyright law is unclear. In the light of the CJEU’s expansive interpretation of the 
scope of Article 3 of the E-Commerce Directive, such sites could be held liable for 
communicating works to the public. Under U.S. copyright law the legal situation in 
terms of UGC and file host streaming platforms has become clearer in light of recent 
case law. In Viacom v. YouTube and Capitol Records v Vimeo the U.S. Supreme Court 
of Appeal found that UGC streaming platforms can rely on the DMCA’s hosting safe 
harbour as long as they comply with the notice-takedown procedure and do not 
actively acknowledge or approve UGC. The liability of streaming box distributors has 
been addressed by the CJEU in its Filmspeler decision. Streaming box distributors are 
directly liable for communicating works to the public, if they install add-ons that give 
access to unauthorised streaming content. In the U.S., streaming box distributors are 
most likely not liable for direct copyright infringement but could be held liable as a 
secondary infringer under the principles of contributory infringement. South African 
copyright law would allow courts to establish the principles of contributory liability, 
thus, streaming box distributors could be held secondary liable. However, with the 
proposed introduction of the ‘communication to the public’ and ‘making available’ 
rights, South African courts could also follow the European approach and hold them 
liable for communicating works to the public.  
 
As previously stated, there has been very little South African case law on copyright 
infringement online and no case law concerning streaming platforms. Therefore, the 
question remains how South African courts should deal with possible future cases. 
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South Africa has the benefit of being able to learn from the positive and negative 
examples of how the EU and the U.S. have dealt with the matter. On the one hand, the 
introduction of the ‘communication to the public’ right would suggest that South 
African courts take account of the case law of the CJEU. On the other hand, South 
African copyright law is broad enough to include the principles of contributory, 
vicarious and inducement liability developed by U.S. case law. With regard to legal 
certainty, the adoption of the CJEU expansive interpretation of Article 3’s right of 
‘communication to the public’ does not seem appropriate. The CJEU has extended the 
scope of the ‘communication to the public’ right to the extent that even the sale of 
devices containing software linking to unlawfully uploaded content can constitute a 
direct infringement in form of communicating works to the public. There is much to 
be said that such conduct seems to be ‘wrong’ but this does not mean that it has to be 
considered a direct copyright infringement. Furthermore, the CJEU introduced the 
knowledge requirement within the scope of Article 3 of the E-Commerce Directive, 
which has no legal basis in the wording of Article 3, nor in the equivalent provisions 
of the Berne Convention or WCT329. In this context, one has to bear in mind that 
secondary liability is not harmonised on EU level due to a lack of consensus among 
the Member States.330 Thus, with its judgements in Filmspeler and The Pirate Bay the 
CJEU seems to overexpand the notion of communication to the public, in order to 
harmonise secondary liability on EU level. Finally, the CJEU has pointed out that the 
criteria established in precedent case law are mere guidelines and have to be applied 
against the background of the facts of the specific case, which also does not provide 
for much legal certainty and leaves streaming platform operators in the dark.  
 
The approach of U.S. courts in terms of the liability of streaming platforms provides 
more legal certainty and balance. In terms of UGC streaming platforms, the Supreme 
Court has clarified and confirmed the safe harbours’ scope. With regard to link-sharing 
and link indexing platforms the ‘server test’ provides for a clear and understandable 
distinction between primary and secondary liability. Furthermore, unlike European 
copyright law, the DMCA’s safe harbours provide for an express limitation of liability 
for linking. However, it has to be noted that the principles of secondary liability as 
well as the ‘server test’ are judge made law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Article 8 of the WCT 
330 E Derclay Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright Law (2009) 212-241.  
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In South Africa limited case law exists in terms of online copyright infringement - the 
reasons for this are manifold but it cannot be expected that we are going to see 
substantially more litigation in this area in the foreseeable future. Therefore, with the 
aim to improve legal certainty and to foster internet investments of streaming 
platforms, it is suggested here that South Africa introduces into its copyright law a 
coherent and comprehensible system of intermediary liability, which also covers the 
various forms of streaming platforms. To achieve that, South Africa should implement 
into the Copyright Act of 1978 a provision that regulates secondary liability for 
copyright infringements.331 Moreover, the lawmaker should revise the safe harbour 
provisions, in particular the requirement of being part of an industry representative 
body, to ensure that all UGC and link-indexing streaming platforms can benefit from 
the limitations, when they meet the general requirements of those provisions. With 
regard to the status of linking, South Africa could provide for more legal certainty and 
balance between the interests of right holders and platforms by implementing a 
definition of communication to the public that is based on the ‘server test’. However, 
this thesis suggests that a clear distinction is be made between push links (deep links 
and hyperlinks) and pull links (embedded and framed links). The former should not be 
considered a communication to the public, while the latter may qualify as a 
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